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THE BURKA BAN: DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN FRANCE AND IN THE U.S.A.
Ioanna Tourkochoriti*
ABSTRACT
Six years after prohibiting the wearing of headscarves by students in public
schools, the French state passed a law prohibiting the wearing of burkas in public
places. Compared to France, in the United States there is more tolerance for wearing
signs of religious affiliation. The difference in legal responses can be understood in
reference to a different background understanding of the fundamental presuppo-
sitions of republicanism in the two legal and political orders, which also define their
conception of secularism. The law enacted in France can be understood in a general
frame of a paternalistic state, which is seen as permitted to dictate the proper exer-
cise of their reason to the citizens. In the United States, the dominant understanding
of republicanism attempts to reconcile the natural rights philosophy with the con-
ception of the common good. The trust in the use of collective power and the
legislature dominant in France can be opposed to the distrust towards the same
elements in the United States.
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We must support these women. Only France can do it, as it has a
frame for this. Muslim women have a right to the respect and the
protection of the Republic.1
Six years after banning the hijab2 for students in public schools,3 France enacted
a law banning the burka in public places.4 Similar legislation was enacted in Belgium.5
In Denmark, according to a recent law, schools and public services are allowed to reg-
ulate the wearing of headscarves by employees.6 In the Netherlands, new draft leg-
islation is being prepared to ban burkas and other face coverings.7 In Italy, a law of
1 ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, RAPPORT D’INFORMATION FAIT EN APPLICATION DE L’ARTICLE
145 DU RÉGLEMENT, No. 2262, at 151 (2010) (Fr.) (statement of Sihem Habchi, President
of the association Ni Putes Ni Soumises) [hereinafter RAPPORT D’INFORMATION].
2 The hijab covers the head and the neck, the niqab covers the face except for the eyes,
and the burka covers the face entirely. Id. at 26.
3 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes
ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées
publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 regulating, in accordance with the principle of
secularism, the wearing of symbols or clothing denoting religious affiliation in schools and
high schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190.
4 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace
public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in
public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 11, 2010, p. 18344.
5 The Belgian Chamber of Deputies approved the law on April 28, 2010. The Senate did
not interfere with the law in the fifteen-day deadline. After France, Belgium Approves Ban
on Burqa, EUR. UNION TIMES, June 6, 2011, http://www.eutimes.net/2011/06/after-france
-belgium-approves-ban-on-burqa/.
6 Under . . . [existing] legislation, schools can require teachers and pupils
to make their faces visible and public employers can require the same
of home helpers, social workers and educators. Social service casework-
ers can require that a client’s face is not covered when her case is being
attended, and . . . [similarly] for identification procedures, such as entry
or exit on public transport.
No Burka Ban Forthcoming, COPENHAGEN POST ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2010, http://jp.dk/uknews
/article1963168.ece.
7 Michael Haggerson, Netherlands to Propose Burqa Ban, JURIST, Sept. 16, 2011, http://
jurist.org/paperchase/2011/09/netherlands-to-propose-burqa-ban.php.
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general applicability prohibiting the covering of the face in public places8 contains
exceptions that apply to coverings for religious reasons,9 but members of Parliament
are discussing lifting the exception.10 In Austria, the debate is still open.11 In Spain, the
lower chamber of the Parliament rejected a legislative proposal to ban the burka.12
In Germany, “[e]ight out of 16 Länder introduced a headscarf ban” for teachers in pub-
lic schools.13 The European Court of Human Rights has twice rejected applications
concerning headscarf bans for teachers on admissibility basis and has deferred to the
authority of the states regarding the regulation of students’ dress.14 The European Union
antidiscrimination legislation regarding access to employment does not provide a
legal basis to invalidate legislation banning headscarves to state employees.15 In the
United States, only two states have banned religious apparel worn by teachers.16
8 SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL, MINISTERO DELL’INTERNO, CHARTER OF VALUES CITIZENSHIP
AND INTEGRATION para. 26 (2007), available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export
/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration.pdf.
9 Willy Fautré, Is the Burqa Compatible with Women’s Rights? The “Burqa Issue” in
the EU, available at http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=5170
(citing circular of the ministry of the interior dated July 24, 2004 that headscarves are al-
lowed but have to be removed for identity controls).
10 Italian local authorities have introduced restrictive regulations, and the Northern League
has introduced a bill before Parliament that would outlaw Islamic face veils. See Police Stop
Muslim Woman Wearing Veil in Italy, BBC NEWS (May 3, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2
/hi/8658017.stm.
11 See John Paul Putney, France Burqa Ban to Take Effect April 11, JURIST, Mar. 4, 2011,
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/03/france-burqa-ban-to-take-effect-april-11.php. In August
2010, Austria’s conservative Freedom Party called for a special vote in order to prohibit
burkas. Id.
12 Alan Clendenning & Harold Heckle, Spain Parliament Rejects Burqa Ban—for Now,
MSNBC.COM (July 20, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38332675/ns/world_news
-europe/t/spain-parliament-rejects-burka-ban-now.
13 Julia von Blumenthal, Dealing with Religious Pluralism in a Federal System: The
Headscarf Debate in Germany, 10–12 (Apr. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities 2011 World Convention
at Columbia University). There are four models of legal responses to headscarves for
teachers: i) the liberal model, applied in the Eastern Länder except Berlin; in Hamburg,
Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate, where no legislation exists; ii) the model of
flexible regulation, dominant in Bremen and Lower Saxony, where legislation bans pro-
vocative religious symbols, without mentioning explicitly the headscarf; iii) the Christian
model, dominant in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg; Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia and
Hesse, where symbols which threaten the neutrality of the land and the political, religious
and ideological peace in schools are prohibited (Christian and Jewish symbols are explicitly
excluded); iv) the secular model, dominant in Berlin, where all religious symbols are pro-
hibited for public servants who come in contact with clients. Id.
14 See infra Part I.A.2.
15 Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) (EC); see infra Part I.A.3.
16 See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
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These prohibitions have been criticized as contrary to federal antidiscrimination leg-
islation on the access to employment.17 Bans of the hijab directed at students have
not been upheld.18
This Article aims to present some of the political ideas that led to the two laws
in France. Previous studies have focused on specific characteristics of French
republicanism, such as universalism and the fear of communalism, according to
which signs that indicate religious affiliation should not be allowed in the public
sphere because they detract from the collective deliberation on the public good.19 In
opposition, the United States, public visibility of religious affiliation is allowed.20
This Article stresses the role of the state as a key factor in determining a specific
understanding of republicanism and secularism in France and the United States, and
the visibility, or lack, of signs of religious affiliation. The difference in protection
of religious expression lies in the consideration of the role of the state concerning
the definition of the content and the limits of liberty: freedom through the state in
France, freedom from the state in the United States.21 This operates on the level of
the imaginary22: the different constitutive myths on the role of the state in the two
legal orders.23
Secularism, a concept associated with modernity, depends on the context in which
it appears.24 Possible meanings of secularism are the absence of reference to reli-
gious belief as an interpretative scheme of the origins and the direction of the world,
the separation between church and state, or the exit of a situation where religion
17 See infra notes 210–18 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 189–96 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., JOHN R. BOWEN, Introduction to WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE
HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE AND PUBLIC SPACE 4–5 (2007); Christine T. Sistare,
“Conspicuous” Religious Symbols and Laïcité, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE
WORLD 129–44 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010).
20 See, e.g., Wilfred M. McClay, Secularism, American-Style, 44 CULTURE & SOC’Y
160 (2007).
21 See BOWEN, supra note 19 (also referencing the role of the state to understanding the
visibility of religion in the United States and its absence in France).
22 See CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, THE IMAGINARY INSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (Kathleen
Blamey trans., 1987). For an analysis of the philosophy which constitutes the background
understanding of republicanism on the imaginary level in France and in the United States,
see Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Freedom of Expression and the Protection of Human Dignity and
Privacy in the French Legal Order and the Legal Order of the United States: A Study on Two
Different Constitutional Precomprehensions (Sept. 24, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) (on file with author).
23 See T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United
States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 430 (2004).
24 See José Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 76 SOC. RES. 1049, 1051 (2009). For
a comparison of the different approaches on the separation of church and state between France
and the United States, see AHMET T. KURU, SECULARISM AND STATE POLICIES TOWARD
RELIGION: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND TURKEY (2009), and James Q. Whitman,
Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide, 34 HIST. REFLECTIONS 86, 86 (2008).
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operates in the structure of the state imposing political forms and defining the econ-
omy of the social bond.25 In this Article, the concept is used in reference to the latter
meaning. Pure secularism is “a counterfactual ideal.”26 Different ex ante understand-
ings concerning the role of the state and the meaning of liberty can lead to different
conceptions of the role of the state in implementing this secularism. Does secularism
apply only to the state or does it affect the citizen’s freedom of religion as well? The
question emerged concerning the permissibility of signs of religious affiliation asso-
ciated with civil servants and users of public services. For state employees it is
easier to justify bans for signs of religious affiliation on the basis of state neutrality
towards religion than it is for users of public service. However, even in this case,
issues of employment discrimination might emerge. If secularism applies to the
state, extending it to users of public service, like students, does not seem justified.
If the dominant conception in the United States reflects a bottom-up secularism
that allows expression of difference, the dominant conception in France reflects a
top-to-bottom imposition of a negation of these differences in the public sphere to
the extent that they do not abide by the official version of human dignity accepted
and affirmed by the French state. The burka ban, like the hijab ban, is justified by
the need to protect girls who wear it from social pressure when the choice to wear
it is not their own.27 It also aims to protect them from themselves when wearing the
burka happens to be an authentic choice of the women concerned.28 The difference
in the legal responses to headscarves reflects and consolidates an ex ante understand-
ing of the conception of the role of the state in defining the content and the limits of
liberty in the two legal orders. Behind the rationale of accommodation of manifes-
tation of religion in the public sphere, versus negation of the same manifestation,
lies a rationale on the legitimized degree of state intervention upon civil society.
In the United States, the state is permitted to intervene in order to protect negative
liberty. In France, the state is permitted to guarantee the very possibility for the ex-
ercise of liberty that, is to guarantee that the distinction between formal liberty and
real liberty does not exist. In other words, the state assures the very possibility of the
concrete exercise of liberty.29 This leads to a slippery slope that disregards individu-
ality in the name of protecting it.
25 MARCEL GAUCHET, LA RELIGION DANS LA DÉMOCRATIE, PARCOURS DE LA LAÏCITÉ
11 (1998).
26 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Myth of the Neutral State and the Individualization of Religion:
The Relationship Between State and Religion in the Face of Fundamentalism, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2445 (2009) (discussing conceptual difficulties surrounding the idea of state neutrality);
Michel Rosenfeld, Introduction: Can Constitutionalism, Secularism and Religion Be Reconciled
in an Era of Globalization and Religious Revival?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2333, 2354 (2009).
27 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 13, 22, 128.
28 Id. at 22.
29 See Patrick Weil, Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2699,
2704–05, 2714 (2009) (noting that in the United States, the individual relies more on the
religious group as protector against any intrusion of the state).
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By definition, the conception of a right presupposes social interaction and state
intervention. Rights are a set of rules that apply to social interaction to the extent
that the state allows it by sanctioning their protection.30 Whether rights will be con-
sidered as “trump[ing] . . . collective goals,”31 or if collective decisions will outweigh
the protection of rights, depends entirely on the political philosophy on the role of
the state underlying and inspiring the relevant legal rules. There are subtle nuances
in the understanding of the content and the limits of a right when the point of de-
parture of every analysis—in other words, the presumption concerning the interpre-
tation of the content and the limits of a right—is in favor of the individual or society.
These subtle nuances are visible in freedom of religious expression in France and
in the United States. Their origins lie in the political problems the two democracies
confronted at their foundation and throughout their evolution. The qualitatively dif-
ferent responses to these problems posed a general frame inside which all evolutions
and revolutions have been operating.
The French conception of liberty, as it was enunciated in 1789 and redeveloped
during the constitutional continuity of the post-revolutionary period, is marked by the
paradox of attempting to find a liberalism of the subject and freedom of conscience,
as well as a liberty by the state.32 This conception defines the understanding of the nec-
essary measures of promoting secularism. Although the term “secularism” applies
principally to the state, France proposes a paradoxical understanding of secularism,
which extends its application to the freedom of religion of the citizens. The case law
of the European Court of Human Rights indicates acceptance of the same tendency
concerning an extensive role of the state in promoting secularism in Europe.33
A different conception of republicanism is dominant in the United States.
Americans invented a political science that reconciles republicanism with the po-
litical philosophy of natural rights.34 According to the conception of American re-
publicanism, private liberty is protected because it promotes this republicanism. As
Alexis de Tocqueville notes, what motivates participation in the public sphere is the
realization that it is the best way to protect negative liberty according to “self-
interest properly understood.”35 This republicanism makes the distinction between
30 See generally CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT
(2007).
31 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xv (1977) (explaining the famous
characterization of rights as “political trumps”).
32 LUCIEN JAUME, L’INDIVIDU EFFACÉ OU LE PARADOXE DU LIBÉRALISME FRANÇAIS
(1997).
33 See infra Part I.A.2.
34 See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM xv (1994)
[hereinafter ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS]; see also MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL
RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION
4–5 (1996) [hereinafter ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC].
35 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 527 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969).
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the private and the public indispensable, whereas for French republicanism, liberty
is consubstantial to the public good. American republicanism is founded on a con-
ception of negative liberty as an element that defines national identity and assures
the cohesion of the multicultural society of the United States. Thus, if “a peculiarly
American conception of the relation between religion and government—one that
emphasizes the integrity and diversity of religious life rather than the secularism of
the state”36 is dominant, this is precisely due to the natural rights Lockean philosophy,
which underlies the American legal order.37
This opposition between trust in the use of collective power dominant in France,
versus distrust dominant in the United States, manifests itself as trust or distrust to-
wards the legislator. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
aims at guiding the legislator towards realizing the content of liberty, whereas the
American declaratory texts aim at limiting the legislative power.38 The delay in the
institution of constitutionality control in France is a sign of this fascination towards
the exercise of collective state power through the legislative branch.39 In the United
States, on the contrary, the constitutionality control of the Supreme Court is a very
important element of the constitutional equilibrium.40 The judiciary is “the least
dangerous branch” in a conception of state power organized on the basis of checks
and balances.41
This Article does not propose an originalist approach of constitutional inter-
pretation—rather, it stresses that any understanding of the role of the state is con-
ditioned by our situation in a world of shared meanings.42 The ultimate source of the
36 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1416 (1990).
37 This is, however, contrary to McConnell’s basic position, in which he distinguishes
between the Lockean philosophy of natural rights and the emphasis on the integrity and di-
versity of religious life. Id. at 1416. McConnell rejects the idea of natural rights as a
justificatory basis for the protection of free exercise of religion in order to transcend the di-
vision between “liberalism” and “republicanism,” that is individualism and the need to instill
civic virtue in the citizens. Id. However, if we follow Michael Zuckert’s suggestion that a po-
litical philosophy of natural rights is compatible with a political science of republicanism,
which was the basis of the American experiment in politics, in opposition to the republican
models of antiquity, the division vanishes. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 34. Locke
himself does not negate participation in politics, rather, he stresses that politics should have
the specific aim of protecting the rights of individuals. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309–24 (David Wootton ed., 1993).
38 See infra Part II.B.1–2.
39 See infra Part II.B.1.
40 See infra Part II.B.2.
41 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
42 See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 188–93 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson
trans., 1962) (discussing the concepts of understanding and interpretation). For a theory of legal
interpretation inspired by Heidegger, see HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
(Joel Weinsheimere & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 2004).
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legitimacy of law is in the understanding of the dominant ideas of political and moral
philosophy which underlie the formation of its content and which are submitted to the
trial of time and to the variability and evolution of political and social necessities.43
The meaning of a constitutional text is defined by the understanding of its interpreters,
which evolves over time.44 The sense of a constitutional clause depends on the un-
derstanding of its framers at the moment when it was written, as well as on the un-
derstanding of all subsequent interpreters who, at a second moment, are trying to
respond to the problems that have emerged throughout constitutional history.45 Some
ideas that existed during the founding era are reinterpreted depending on context and
lead to new associations of thoughts by combining old and new elements on the
proper meaning of a constitutional term. Even if the current state of the law on
freedom of religion is due to “the full flowering of the Warren Court,” it neverthe-
less expresses elements that are “consonant with [the conception of the framers and]
popular notions of religious liberty and limited government that existed at the time
of the framing” in the United States.46 Although freedom of religion did not always
enjoy equal protection, in the United States today, the natural rights philosophy of
the founding era justifies a very strong protection of freedom of religion. Although
there is disagreement on the meaning of the First Amendment to the Framers before
and after its incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment,47 the Federal Bill of Rights
contains the common denominator of liberties already protected at the state level.
Thus, an ex ante understanding of a natural rights philosophy combined with the
proper textual elements can lead to severe protection of religious liberty and its man-
ifestations like the one dominant today. As Martha Nussbaum notes, “a tradition of
legal argument [can] gradually refine[ ], deepen[ ] and extend[ ] [the] idea of what
free exercise requires,”48 thanks to the evolution of the interpretation of ideas and
terms that already exist in the constitutional text or at the moment of the founding.
In France, the trial of history has also led to compromises and alterations of the basic
ideas, which shaped the creation of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
43 For a parallel approach, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY
MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009)
(discussing constitutional interpretation and changes in constitutional understandings).
44 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008); LAURENCE H. TRIBE
& MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991).
45 See Olivier Cayla, La Notion de Signification en Droit: Contribution à une Théorie du
Droit Naturel de la Communication (unpublished manuscript, University Panthéon-Assas
Paris II, 1992) (on file with author) (transposing to legal interpretation HENRI GASTON
GOUHIER, LE THÉÂTRE ET LES ARTS À DEUX TEMPS (1989)).
46 McConnell, supra note 36, at 1410, 1412, 1414–15.
47 For a presentation of the conflicting interpretations, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY
OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 106–14
(2008). See also Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992).
48 NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 222.
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the Citizen. A hard core of fundamental conceptions of political theory remains in-
tact and finds expression in the legal responses to the exercise of fundamental rights.
Banning the burka is certainly a hard case where equally important principles
seem to be in conflict: gender equality versus self-definition. Is the state permitted to
protect women from themselves under the pretext that they are operating under a false
consciousness,49 that they do not exercise their freedom properly when they choose
to wear a headscarf? Who has the right to decide what people will wear in the public
sphere? Who is permitted to interpret the meaning of wearing a headscarf? A closer
examination of the question raises doubts as to whether a ban is the proper way to
respond to gender inequality and to integrate minority religious communities in a
relatively uniform and solid conception of citizenship. These questions will be raised
and analyzed in the Part III of this Article.
I. THE CONFLICTING LEGAL RESPONSES
A. The Total Prohibition of French Law and Its Evaluation from the Point of
View of Supranational Law
1. French Internal Law
The French law separating church and the state dissociates religion from the
civil power by abolishing the public status of churches.50 The French conception of
laïcité can only be understood in opposition to the Gallican regime, which preceded
it.51 Gallicanism marked the separation between the authority of the Pope and the
authority of the French king,52 separating the Catholic religion from one of its po-
litical dimensions. It affirmed the independence of the French political sphere from
a foreign authority: the French sovereign could control the Gallican Church, which
possessed eminent privileges, such as the control of education.53 In Hegelian terms,
the French laïcité can be understood and defined as a negation of this preeminent
position of the Church. According to the Hegelian insight, the negation of a phenom-
enon operates in the terms of and reproduces the mentality that it tries to negate.54
49 KARL MARX, The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 146, 146–200
(Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2d ed. 1978) (1972).
50 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 relative à la séparation des Églises et de l’État [Law of
December 9, 1905 on the separation of Church and State] tit. 1, art. 2, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 1905.
51 GUY HAARSCHER, LA LAÏCITÉ 10 (1996).
52 Inaugurated by Philippe le Bel (reigned 1285–1314), who objected to pontifical inter-
ference in French internal affairs, Gallicanism was realized by the Pragmatique Sanction de
Bourges (1438), an edict by Charles VII against the papal authority. Id. It was consolidated
with Richelieu and attained its peak under Louis XIV. Id.
53 J. David Markham, The Revolution, Napoleon, and Education, NAPOLEON SERIES, http://
www.napoleon-series.org/research/society/c_education.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
54 G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (J. Sibree trans., 2001).
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If the state defined religion in all its parameters, the state would from now on take
all measures that are negating religion or any kind of manifestation of religion in the
public sphere.
The French Revolution, proclaiming freedom of religion in Article 10 of the
French Declaration,55 affirmed a kind of extreme Gallicanism by radically submitting
the Church to the political sphere. The Directory (September 26, 1795–November 9,
1799) established the first separation of church and state,56 and Napoleon passed an
agreement in 1801 with the Vatican (the Concordat), that established an official rec-
ognition of the Church under which the state strictly controlled its organization and
its activities.57 During the Restoration (1815–1848) Catholicism was reestablished
as a state religion and the Church strengthened its influence on education.58 During
the Second Empire (1852–1870), the political importance of Catholicism grew and
the cardinals became de jure members of the Senate.59 During the Third Republic
(1870–1940) the movement of secularization of the state was renewed.60 The law of
55 Article 10 reads: “No one may be disturbed, on account of his opinions, even religious
ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the [public order
established by the laws].” Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Aug. 26,
1789, reprinted in THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN
AND THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS: A BICENTENNIAL COMMEMORATION 1789–1989, at 1
(1989). Although the decree of December 24, 1789 allowed non-Catholics to be eligible for
fixed conditions, this emancipation did not concern the Jews who were emancipated only by
the decree of September 27th.
56 1795 CONST. 354 (Fr.), available at http://www.elysee.fr/president/la-presidence/les-textes
-fondateurs/les-constitutions-depuis-1791/les-textes-constitutionnels-anterieurs/la-constitution
-du-5-fructidor-an-iii-22-aout.8874.html. According to Article 354 of the Constitution of
Year III (1795), elaborated by the Thermidorian Convention, “No one may be prevented
from exercising the cult of his choice, in conformity with the laws. No one can be forced to
contribute to the expenses of a cult. The Republic does not provide a salary to anyone.” Id.
(this author’s translation).
57 Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2561, 2568–69 (2009);
see also The Concordat of 1801, CONCORDAT WATCH, http://www.concordatwatch.eu/showkb
.php?org_id=867&kb_header_id=826&kb_id=1496.
58 See SARAH A. CURTIS, EDUCATING THE FAITHFUL: RELIGION, SCHOOLING, AND SOCIETY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 21, 23, 24, 89 (2000) (explaining congregational influence
on primary schools increased and the period from 1833 to 1850 was marked by the rise in
the number of schools established, as well as the passage of the Falloux law in 1950, which
increased the Church’s control over education); ALAIN PLESSIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
SECOND EMPIRE 1852–1871, at 116 (Jonathan Mandelbaum trans., 1985) (stating that the
Falloux law gave the Church the power to open secondary schools); Scott M. Berg, In the
Shadow of Josephinism: Austria and the Catholic Church in the Restoration 1815–1848
(Aug. 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll.), available at
http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-07092010-111611/unrestricted/BergThesis.pdf (explaining
the restored power of the papacy and role of religion in French schools during the Restoration).
59 PLESSIS, supra note 58, at 18.
60 Dominique Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War? The French
Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 350 (2006).
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1905 abolished the public status of churches, by ending public funding for them.61
The Constitution of 1946 confirmed this principle of neutrality and the Constitution
of 1958 reaffirmed it.62
The first headscarf cases appeared in France in 1989, when three students from
the Creil Lower Secondary School were expelled for refusing to remove their head-
scarves in class, despite the request of the school authorities.63 The supreme adminis-
trative jurisdiction, the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in its first advisory opinion
on the issue expressed that: signs of religious affiliation worn by pupils are not
incompatible with laïcité if wearing them does not constitute, by its ostentatious or
protesting character, an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda; if
it does not violate the dignity or the freedom of the students or of other members of
the school community; if it does not endanger their health or security; obstructing
teaching activities and the educative role of the instructors; or if it does not disturb
order in the school or the normal functioning of the public service.64 The Council
deferred to school authorities to regulate the conditions of wearing religious signs
by the students and to decide when these signs justify disciplinary measures.65 Ever
since, in the absence of a general law banning headscarves, in its judicial capacity,
the Conseil d’État gave a number of moderate decisions on the issue.66 According
61 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 relative à la séparation des Églises et de l’État [Law of
December 9, 1905 on the separation of Church and State] tit. 1, art. 2, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 1905 (“The
Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees freedom of worship, subject only to
restrictions set forth below in the interest of public order” and affirming the principle of
separation, “[t]he Republic does not recognize, pay or subsidize any cult.”).
62 “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure
the equality of all citizens before the law without distinction of origin, race or religion. It
shall respect all beliefs.” 1958 CONST. 1.
63 BOWEN, supra note 19, at 83.
64 CE Ass., Nov. 27, 1989, No. 346.893, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde
/media/document//avis/346893.pdf.
65 Id.
66 See, e.g.,CE Sect., Oct. 20, 1999, No. 181486 (upholding expulsions from school based
on failure to comply with the duty of assiduity, following students’ refusal to remove head-
scarves during physical education and sports classes); CE Sect., Apr. 2, 1997, No. 173103
(ruling that only acts of pressure or proselytism or of interference with public order in the
school can justify disciplinary measures); CE Sect., Nov. 27, 1996, No. 169522 (same); CE
Sect., Mar. 10, 1995, No. 159981 (upholding expulsions from school based on failure to
comply with the duty of assiduity); CE Sect., March 14, 1994, No. 145656 (invalidating
school regulation banning the “covered head” on the grounds that it violates article 2 of the
Constitution of October 4, 1958 and article 10 of the law 89-486 of July 10, 1989, which
reads: “In schools, students have the right to freedom of expression and to freedom of infor-
mation in the respect of pluralism and the principle of neutrality. The exercise of these liberties
cannot burden educational activities.”); CE Sect., Nov. 2, 1992, No. 130394 (invalidating in
one instance for abuse of power school regulations imposing a ban on the wearing of any
distinctive religious signs in class or on school premises).
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to the doctrine dominant in French administrative law, the Conseil d’État is not com-
petent to judge the constitutionality of a law but only the conformity to the law of
administrative acts.67
The legislation, enacted in 2004, prohibits the display of conspicuous religious
symbols,68 which violate the “dignity” of the person who bears them according to
the dominant opinion in France, by the students of “public elementary and high
schools,” and can be understood within the general conception of the state as per-
mitted to define the content and the proper exercise of religious liberty within the
context of schools. The law applies to all state schools and educational institutions,
including post-baccalaureate courses (preparatory classes for entrance to the Grandes
Écoles and vocational training courses), but does not apply to state universities.69
Recently, the Conseil d’État refused to grant French nationality to a woman wearing
a niqab on the basis of “absence of assimilation.”70
In its advisory role, the Conseil d’État prepared a report on the possible “legal
grounds for banning the full veil.”71 In this report, which is not binding, the Conseil
67 1 ANDRÉ DE LAUBADÈRE, JEAN-CLAUDE VENEZIA & YVES GAUDEMET, TRAITÉ DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 415 (1999). For a critique of this approach from the point of view of legal
hermeneutics, see infra Part II.B.1.
68 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port
de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et
lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 regulating in accordance with the principle
of secularism, the wearing of symbols or clothing denoting religious affiliation in public
primary and secondary schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 15, 2004, p. 5190. The famous law added article
L.141-5-1 to the Education Code which provides: “In schools, colleges, and public high
schools, the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils overtly manifest a religious affiliation
is prohibited. The rules shall state that the implementation of a disciplinary procedure is
proceeded by a dialogue with the student.” Id. For discussion, see BOWEN, supra note 19,
and JONATHAN LAURENCE & JUSTIN VAISSE, INTEGRATING ISLAM, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS
CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE, ch. 6 (2006).
69 Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, art. 1 (Fr.); see also LAURENCE & VAISSE, supra
note 68, at 163.
70 CE, June 29, 2008, No. 286798. Despite the fact that the husband of the applicant is
a French national, the wife “has adopted a radical practice of her religion, incompatible with
the essential values of the French community and in particular with the principle of gender
equality; thus she does not fulfill the condition of assimilation posed by Article 21-4 of the
civil code” Id. (this author’s translation). For commentary, see Katrin Bennhold, A Veil Closes
France’s Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2008, at A1; Steven Erlanger, Burqa
Furor Scrambles the Political Debate in France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A6; and
Stéphanie Le Bars, Vivre en France avec le Niqab, LE MONDE, June 23, 2009, available at
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/06/23/vivre-en-france-avec-le-niqab_1210261
_3224.html.
71 CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, ÉTUDE RELATIVE AUX POSSIBILITÉS JURIDIQUES D’INTERDICTION DU
PORT DU VOILE INTÉGRAL REPORT [STUDY OF POSSIBLE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR BANNING THE
FULL VEIL] (Mar. 25, 2010). The report was adopted by the full general assembly of the
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d’État makes reference to the case K.A. et A.D. v. Belgium of the European Court of
Human Rights, which emphasized “the protection of [the liber arbitrium] as a consub-
stantial aspect of the human person” and in consequence of her dignity.72 The report
foresees the possibility of banning the veil in two instances: in order to protect public
security and to assure recognition of the person in specific places.73 The latter instance
is bound in particular to the requirements of some public services or to the application
of regulations, which include restrictions or distinctions, bound to identity or age.74
Despite this report, the French Parliament enacted the law, which bans  con-
cealing one’s face in public places.75 The law is a prima facie law of general 
Conseil d’État on March 25, 2010, and prepared following the Prime Minister’s letter of
mission dated January 29, 2010. Id.
72 Id. at 21–22 (discussing K.A. & A.D. v. Belgium, App. Nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int).
73 Id. at 41.
74 Id.
75 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimination du visage dans l’espace
public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in
public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344. Enacted as text no. 524 by the House of Representatives
on July 13, and as text no. 161 by the Senate on September 14, 2010, the law reads:
Article 1: No person, in public, [can wear] clothing designed to conceal
his face.
Article 2:
I. For the purposes of Article 1, the public space is made up
of public roads and places open to the public or posted to a
public service.
II. The prohibition in Article 1 shall not apply if the outfit is
required or permitted by law or regulations, if justified by
health or professional reasons, or if it takes place in the con-
text of sports, festivals, or artistic or traditional events.
Article 3: Ignorance of the prohibition contained in Article 1 is pun-
ishable by fines of the second class. The obligation to complete the
citizenship course referred to in Article 8 of 131-16 of the Penal Code
may be awarded in addition to or instead of the fine.
Article 4: After section 1a of Chapter V of Title II of Book II of the
Criminal Code, it is inserted a section 1b, which reads: Section 1b
“From the forced concealment of the face Art. 225-4-10. Forcing
through threat, violence, coercion, abuse of authority or power a person
or persons to conceal their faces because of their sex is punished by
one year imprisonment and a fine of €30,000 . When the fact is com-
mitted against a minor, the penalty is increased to two years of impris-
onment and a fine of €60,000.
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applicability.76 The French Constitutional Council upheld constitutionality of Articles
1 and 2 of the law.77 According to the Council, the legislators were concerned that
concealing the face could be a danger to public order and could show a lack of
awareness of the minimal requirements of life in society.78 The prohibition was jus-
tified as promoting the principles of women’s liberty and equality.79 This is not a dis-
proportional measure in view of protecting the public order, because wearing the
burka is not prohibited in places of worship.
2. The Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regarding
headscarf prohibitions reflects an understanding of the role of the state that legiti-
mizes it in limiting freedom of religion rights for teachers and students. By deferring
to the judgment of the member states of the European Convention of Human Rights
as to the proper way of implementing secularism,80 the ECHR created a situation
which allows the state to dictate the proper content of religious liberty, even in cases
where no harm to others exists.
France is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed81 and rati-
fied82 the European Convention of Human Rights. The Convention constitutes
a legal rule of superior value in the hierarchy of the legal rules83 and protects
freedom of religious conscience.84 The case law of the ECHR creates a jus
Article 5: Articles 1 to 3 come into force at the expiration of a period
of six months from the date of enactment of this Act.
Article 6: This Act applies throughout the territory of the Republic.
Article 7: The Government submits to Parliament a report on the im-
plementation of this Act eighteen months after its promulgation. This
report assesses the implementation of this Act, accompanying measures
developed by the public authorities and the difficulties encountered.
76 Id.
77 Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] No. 2010-613DC, Oct. 7, 2010,
J.O. 18345.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See infra notes 87–96 and accompanying text.
81 France signed the European Convention of Human Rights on Nov. 4, 1950. See Chart
of Signatures and Ratifications of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., available at http://www.conventions.coe.int.
82 France ratified the European Convention of Human Rights on May 3, 1974. Id.
83 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 46,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
84 Article 9 of the ECHR reads as follows:
Article 9—Freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
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commune85 in the human rights domain in Europe constituting the source of a quasi-
constitutional human rights law for the legal orders of the member states. In the
famous case ahin v. Turkey,86 the ECHR found that a headscarf ban did not vio-
late the freedom of religion of students in Turkish Universities. In coming to this
conclusion, the ECHR deferred to the “margin of appreciation” of the state.87
Considering the protection of public order, it held that local authorities were in a
better position than the court to decide whether the ban was a measure justified in
principle and proportionate to the aim pursued.88 The judgment of the court certainly
reflects the idea that this kind of prohibition is not significant enough, which would
legitimize it as an international institution to decide in favor of a violation of free-
dom of religion. By not considering this violation as important enough, the court
reproduces the dominant ideology in Europe in favor of state-imposed secularism
to the detriment of religious freedom. By refusing to judge if there was violation, the
court de facto creates a situation that justifies the ban. The decision does not reflect
a philosophy that gives particular importance to rights as “trumps”89 against govern-
mental decisions. Instead, it promotes the philosophy that the state can enforce sec-
ularism in the public sphere by limiting religious expression.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.”
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 83, art. 9; see also MALCOLM D. EVANS,
MANUAL ON THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC AREAS 7–24 (2009); JEAN-
FRANÇOIS RENUCCI, ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM
OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION (2005); Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the
Public Space: In Search of a European Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2669, 2672–76 (2009).
85 This is particularly true after the implementation of Protocol No. 11, which allows the
individual to appeal directly to the court and not only to the Commission. In the past, sub-
mitting to the Commission meant that this right is submitted to a declaration of acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pmbl. art. 1, Nov. 5, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155.
86 ahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 55.
87 The court uses the legal term “margin of appreciation” when deferring to the eval-
uations of the member states of the Council of Europe on whether limitations on the exercise
of a right are “necessary” and “proportionate” in a democratic society. See id. at 26–30.
88 Id. at 30 (noting that “univerity authorities are . . . better placed than an international
court to evaluate local needs,” the court found the interference “justified in principle and
proportionate to the aim pursued”).
89 DWORKIN, supra note 31, at xi.
806 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:791
The ECHR has held that headscarf bans in secondary schools are within the
“margin of appreciation” of the state to regulate the means that serve the legitimate
aim of preserving the neutral and secular character of secondary education.90 The
measure is proportionate because it applies to all pupils independently from their
religious beliefs, and subsequent cases of national jurisdictions have followed this
case law.91 In Dogru v. France92 and Kervanci v. France93 (both cases predating the
enactment of the 2004 law), the ECHR held that the expulsion of a student from
secondary school for refusing to remove her headscarf during physical education
was compatible with the requirement of secularism.94 The court deferred anew to the
“margin of appreciation” of the national authorities “to ensure that, in keeping with
the principle of respect for pluralism and the freedom of others, the manifestation
by pupils of their religious beliefs on school premises did not take on the nature of
an ostentatious act that would constitute a source of pressure and exclusion.”95
The court, although protective of individuality in many respects,96 by deferring to
the “margin of appreciation” of the state in all cases that concern religious head-
scarves, accepts and legitimizes a conception of secularism that allows the state to
define even the relation that human beings have with themselves.97 If this is justifiable
90 Köse v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 311 (declaring the application inadmissible).
91 See, e.g., Regina (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.)
101, 116–17 (U.K.) (holding that restrictions in the freedom to manifest religious belief by
school dress codes of a secondary community school are proportionate measures to promote
“the value of religious harmony and tolerance between opposing or competing groups and of
pluralism and broadmindedness; the need for compromise and balance; the role of the state in
deciding what is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others”). In the past, the House
of Lords had held that the refusal of the headmaster of a private school to admit an orthodox
Sikh pupil unless he removed the turban and cut his hair was unlawful discrimination under
the Race Relations Act of 1976. Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) 548 (U.K.).
92 Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://www
.echr.coe.int.
93 Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://www
.echr.coe.int.
94 The court found “that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant fully satisfied
the duty to undertake a balancing exercise of the various interests at stake . . . [since] the ban
was limited to the physical education class.” Id. at 21.
95 Dogru, App. No. 27058/05; see also Kervanci, App. No. 31645/04, at 21. The court
also deferred to the margin of appreciation of the state concerning the proportionality of the
definitive expulsion from the school. Dogru, App. No. 27058/05, at 20–21; Kervanci, App.
No. 31645/04, at 21–22.
96 Concerning, for example, sadomasochism in the case K.A. & A.D. v. Belgium. App.
Nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
97 Judge Tulkens, in her dissenting opinion in ahin, noted that “European supervision
cannot . . . be escaped simply by invoking the margin of appreciation.” ahin v. Turkey,
2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 55 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). The same judge, however, justified this
attitude of judicial restraint by the court in reference to the divergence between the states on
the relationship between state and religion. See Françoise Tulkens, The European Convention
on Human Rights and Church-State Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
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for physical education classes, it does not seem to be the same for the classroom. If,
according to the ECHR, headscarf bans in universities are not significant limitations
on religious freedom to justify its intervention, this creates a very strong a fortiori
argument for bans in schools.
The ECHR also examined the permissibility of teachers’ headscarves, discussing
the admissibility of the cases, rather than dealing with the merits. The case in which
this question emerged concerned a primary education teacher who converted to
Islam after she was hired.98 The court held that headscarf bans may be considered
justified in principle and proportionate to the legitimate aims of ensuring the neu-
trality of the state primary education system and the protection of the “rights and
freedoms of others, of public order and public safety.”99 Similarly, the court dis-
missed the application of an associate professor at University of Istanbul who was
subjected to disciplinary measures for wearing a headscarf at work.100 For the court, a
democratic state may be entitled to require by its public servants loyalty to the constitu-
tional principles on which it is founded and, since neutrality is a constitutional principle
of the Turkish state, university dress rules are consistent with the margin of appreci-
ation that the states possess in enforcing secularism.101 Therefore, “the impugned inter-
ference was justified in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued.”102 The famous
decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the teacher headscarf case
decided in between the two ECHR cases is thus compatible with this case law.103
2575, 2577–78 (2009). Because the court is only an international judicial body and not a
constitutional court, it does not consider that it has the requisite legitimacy to determine this
issue. This legitimacy in this specific case could, however, be derived from the role of the
court as a human rights court deciding an issue that concerns fundamental decisions of the
person, just like sadomasochism in the case K.A. & A.D. v. Belgium. See K.A. & A.D., App.
Nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99.
98 Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 449 (declaring the application inadmissible).
99 Id. For the court it “appear[ed] difficult to reconcile . . . Islamic headscar[ves] with the
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that
all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.” Id. The ban is thus “not
unreasonable” and “the Geneva authorities did not exceed their margin of appreciation . . .
having regard . . . to the tender age of the children for whom the applicant was responsible
as a representative of the State.” Id.
100 Kurtulmu v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 297, 311 (declaring the application
inadmissible).
101 Id. at 307.
102 Id.
103 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sep. 24, 2003,
2 BvR 1436/02, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602
.html. The court expressed concerns about the legal medium by which the limitation was
imposed. See id. The court said that an important individual freedom, which is uncondi-
tionally guaranteed when the German Constitution is at stake, its limitations should only be
enacted by a decision of Parliament and not by the executive branch. Id. at paras. 38, 67.
“The crucial decisions in educational policy are to be taken by the legislator, in accordance
with the requirements of the Rechtsstaat and the principle of democracy in the Constitution: it
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It is difficult to predict what would be the opinion of the court for the French law
banning the burka in the streets. If the court approaches the topic as a question of sec-
ularism, it will defer to the margin of appreciation of the state in promoting it, thus
perpetuating its refusal to engage in an active role in favor of religious expression.104
If it chooses to approach the question as an issue of self-definition then the prece-
dent of sadomasochism,105 which accepts wide liberty for the individual, might lead
it to finding a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights.106
According to Patrick Weil, the French Constitutional Council, by recognizing the pos-
sibility to cover one’s face in places of religious worship, explicitly recognized the
religious character of the burka, thus opening the way to an invalidation of the law
by the European Court of Human Rights in reference to Article 9 and the protection
of freedom of religion.107
3. European Union Law Perspectives
Article 6, paragraph 2 of the European Union Treaty108 provides for accession
of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights.109 This acces-
sion concerns also the institutions of the EU, so that they act in a way that respects
the ECHR.110 So far, there is direct communication between the Court of Justice of
is not to be left to those in charge of the schools.” Id. para. 69. Official duties which restrict
the freedom of belief of officials or applicants for office must be strictly justified and strict
equality between the various religions must be observed. Id. para. 39. If the legislator, as part
of its educational policy regarding the relationship of religion and state, decided to ban the
wearing of the hijab in schools this would be an acceptable limitation of the freedom of
religion and would not be inconsistent with Art. 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Id. para. 66.
104 This is as the ahin v. Turkey precedent indicates. See supra notes 86–88 and ac-
companying text.
105 K.A. & A.D. v. Belgium, App. Nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
106 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
107 See Patrick Weil, La Loi sur la Burqa Risque l’Invalidation par l’Europe, LE
MONDE, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article19221; Interview
with Patrick Weil.
108 As amended by the Lisbon Treaty. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, art. 6, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 19 [hereinafter TEU].
109 So far the ECHR has been considered valid law in the European Union because the
member states have individually signed and ratified the treaty. Separate accession to the
community is justified for a number of reasons. First, with EU’s expansion, the Union’s ac-
tivities moved into “fields where human rights concerns are frequently invoked.” DAMIAN
CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 259 (2d ed. 2010). Second, the ECHR acts as a safeguard to the development
of a “fundamental rights system” for the EU itself. Id. Third, the progressive constitution-
alization of the EU raised concerns about whether the EU is “becoming the central locus for
questions about fundamental rights rather than national settlements.” Id.
110 See TEU, supra note 108, arts. 6, 9, 13.
2012] THE BURKA BAN 809
the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights on issues pertaining
to the protection of human rights.111 From the point of view of the secondary leg-
islation of the European Union, which is binding to the member states, the Directive
2000/43/EC “implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irre-
spective of racial or ethnic origin”112 is not likely to be applicable to headscarf bans
since they are not associated with any specific “racial or ethnic origin” for the purposes
of the European Council Directive, unless cases emerge where religious discrimi-
nation is absorbed by racial or ethnic discrimination.113 The preamble to the Directive
states that “[t]he European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the ex-
istence of separate human races. The use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Directive
does not imply an acceptance of such theories,”114 which implies that the concept of
race itself is a social construct based on other attributes that may include culture
or religion.115 The scope of the Directive includes access to education.116 However,
it is inapplicable in the case of the burka ban, as many of the women do not have
French nationality.117
The European Union legislation is of interest to our topic concerning freedom of
religion of state employees like public school teachers. European Council Directive
2000/78/EC against discrimination in access to employment foresees exceptions to
the principle against discrimination on the grounds of religion for state and private
employers.118 The Directive allows states a wide margin of appreciation in defining
111 FRÉDÉRIC SUDRE, DROIT EUROPÉEN ET INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
(2008); CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 109, at 243–46.
112 Council Directive 2000/43, arts. 1–2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC).
113 The concept of ethnicity could be defined on the basis of socio-cultural characteristics,
including religion. The House of Lords in the United Kingdom opted to include two elements
in its definition of an ethnic group: first, a long, shared history as a separate group, and
second, a cultural tradition, including family and social customs. See Mandla v. Dowell Lee
[1983] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) [549]. For the possibility of absorption of religious discrimination in
racial or ethnic discrimination, see the interesting analysis of Dominique Custos, Secularism
in French Public Schools: Back to War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 337, 384–85 (2006).
114 Council Directive 2000/43, supra note 112, 118, pmbl.
115 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (interpreting a person’s
“race” in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as being distinct from the “place or nation of his origin, or his
religion,” and insisting on relativity in the understanding of “race” in time and in space).
116 Council Directive 2000/43, supra note 112, 118, pmbl., art. 3.
117 According to Article 3.2 of the same Directive:
This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nation-
ality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the
entry into and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on
the territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the
legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned.
Id. art. 3.
118 Council Directive 2000/78, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 19 (EC). According to Article 4,
paragraph 1 of the Directive a difference of treatment on the grounds of religion “shall not con-
stitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities
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what constitutes a “genuine and determining occupational requirement,” provided
that the objective is “legitimate” and the requirement is “proportionate.”119 Under
the scope of this Directive, the state can legitimately prevent public teachers from
wearing religious symbols.120 A similar exemption for “a bona fide occupational qual-
ification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise” exists in United States federal antidiscrimination legislation.121 However,
in the European Union Directive there is no reference to the possibility of “reasonable
accommodation” for the employee’s religious observance or practice, as exists in the
American legislation.122
B. The Moderately Restrictive View of American Law
The different historical background in the United States led to a different under-
standing of secularism. In the United States, secularism is based on an accommodation
of the plurality of various sects, which have existed and been renewed throughout cen-
turies by the waves of immigrants flowing into the country.123 If the dominant concep-
tion in France reflects a top-to-bottom imposition of a negation of these differences
in the public sphere—to the extent that they do not abide by the official version of hu-
man dignity promoted by the French state—the dominant conception in the United
States reflects a bottom-up secularism allowing expression of religious differences.
The first religious communities, principally Protestant, were established in
New England during the seventeenth century and were intolerant of newcomers.124
Legislation against religious minorities existed in many colonial states.125 Protection
of freedom of religion emerged gradually. By the beginning of the eighteenth cen-
tury “[t]oleration of dissenters . . . [was] embraced as a matter of principle”126 and
“[d]uring the Revolutionary era, every colony-turned-state [modified] the Church-
State arrangements it had inherited from colonial times.”127 During the debates on
concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate
and the requirement is proportionate.” Id.
119 CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 109, at 562–65.
120 Id. at 564.
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
122 § 2000(j); see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text.
124 THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1986).
125 Legislation against Quakers existed in many New England colonies, such as
Connecticut and Massachusetts. Id.
126 Id. at 78. This was a result of the progressive erosion of the “medieval system of
religious uniformity” and of the emergence of intellectual currents ranging from “extreme
reactionism to religious anarchy.” Id. In eighteenth century America, dissenters were “in a
happier position than their brethren in England.” Id. at 80.
127 Id. at 134.
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the elaboration of the Federal Constitution, there were frequent references to free-
dom of religion as a right whose explicit protection was indispensable by those who
feared that the Federal Constitution would endanger the rights of the states and of
the individuals absent a Bill of Rights.128 Madison is famous for having noted that
the multiplicity of religious sects was itself a guarantee for religious liberty, because
no majority could emerge out of this variety, which could “oppress and persecute
the rest.”129 The multiplicity of sects, as well as the multiplicity of interests, would
assure that the federal government would succeed in establishing a system of gov-
ernment where no section of the population would operate as a faction oppressing
others: this variety would be reflected in a representative government that would
operate on the basis of various checks and balances.130 However, this optimism,
expressed in the context of the debate between Federalists and Antifederalists for the
opportunity to enact a clause protecting free exercise of religion, did not persuade
the Antifederalists, who insisted on more definite guarantees.131 By December 1791,
this led to the elaboration of the Bill of Rights, containing the contemporary clause of
the First Amendment.132 Jefferson was always in favor of a constitutional clause to
ensure the protection of religion.133
A federalist-based reading of the First Amendment offers the possibility of
seeing the Clause as barring Congress from interfering with state establishment
policy.134 Inequality of civil rights on the basis of religious belief persisted in the late
128 Intervention of Mr. Henry in the Debate of June 12, 1788, in 3 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 317 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Ayer Co. 1987) (1888)
[hereinafter 3 DEBATES]. For Henry, a right as “sacred” as religion “ought not to depend on
constructive, logical reasoning.” Id.
129 3 DEBATES, supra note 128, at 330.
130 See McConnell, supra note 36, at 1479.
131 Id. at 1480.
132 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (March 18, 1798), in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 113 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999); Letter to James Madison
(Dec. 20, 1787), in id. at 360–61; Letter to Edward Carrington (May 27, 1788), in id. at 364;
Letter to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in id. at 366; Letter to James Madison (March 15,
1789), in id. at 367–69; Autobiography, in id. at 355.
134 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32–33
(1998). This reading has been criticized as projecting an anachronistic understanding of the term
“establishment,” as the term “establishment” was not understood in the time of the Framers as
referring to a merely preferential religious arrangement; therefore, the power to interfere with
state religious affairs was not among the delimited powers of the Federal Congress and the
non-preferential arrangements of New England were not understood as violating liberty of
conscience. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 407–11 (2002) (discussing CURRY, supra note 124, and the Establishment
Clause). Curry stresses that the characterization of the colonial New York church-state system
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eighteenth century,135 especially depending on the religious affiliation of the new waves
of immigrants arriving in the country. Subsequent waves of immigrants caused re-
actions of intolerance among the existing population, but progressively led to an
understanding of secularism as abstention of the State in the exercise of religion.136
If the First Amendment initially applied only to Congress, the Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress
to enact such laws.137 It is important to distinguish the activities that can be sub-
sumed to the term “exercise” of religion and thus strongly protected. The Supreme
Court has held that ways of life may be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state
as “multiple establishment” is “an understanding that contemporaries did not have.” CURRY,
supra note 124, at 71. Establishment did not necessarily mean an official religion enjoying a
privileged position but rather an “established way of worshipping.” Id. at 105–33. South
Carolina’s Protestant establishment “amounted only to a method for incorporating churches,
and no church received public tax support,” since by 1790 this state’s provisions for freedom
of religion protected all religions equally. Id. at 150–51. The qualification of “corporated and
Established” church was one that many churches sought. Id. at 150. “Connecticut continued
to assume that Congregationalism was . . . established [, while] Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Vermont, though they supported religion financially, did not refer to this as an establish-
ment of religion.” Id. at 191. Both supporters and opponents of “state support of religion
agreed that an establishment of religion . . . constituted a tyrannical intrusion of the gov-
ernment into religious affairs.” Id. The New England states (except Rhode Island) continued
to provide public support of religion and although scholars refer to this practice as a “multiple
establishment,” the citizens of these states did not “describe[ ] themselves as designing an
establishment . . . .” Id. at 213. For Amar, the First Amendment aims at a division of com-
petences between the federal government and the states, protecting state religious arrange-
ments from infringement by the federal government. AMAR, supra, at 32–33. Noah Feldman
stresses that the Amendment was aimed at prohibiting establishments in general and assuring
that the federal government was not going to reverse any of the guarantees for religious lib-
erty won by the revolutionary states. Feldman, supra, at 350. “The framers would never have
imagined that Congress would possess the power to change state arrangements with respect
to religion.” NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 49 (2005). The Amendment “guaranteed two things[,] . . .
that the government would not compel anybody to support any religious teaching or worship
with which [s]he . . . disagreed . . . [and] that the government would not stop anybody from
worshipping or practicing [her] religion as [s]he chose.” Id.
135 Hamburger, supra note 47, at 946.
136 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing
Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 509–10 (2006);
see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001) (analyzing jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause
from a political perspective); McConnell, supra note 36, at 1422–23 (describing the in-
tolerant treatment suffered by new arrivals in Massachusetts and Virginia).
137 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Supreme Court reaffirmed
this doctrine in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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regulation if they are rooted in religious belief and not only on purely secular
considerations.138 The rights of the Amish community to educate its members and
to instill in them a way of life, which is different from the one taught in public
schools, was considered significant enough to outweigh the state interest to compul-
sory high school education for its citizens.139 For the Court, “[a] regulation neutral
on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”140
The crucial inquiry has always been distinguishing between acts dictated by
religious precepts—which can be protected as dictated by a religious normative
system competing to the one imposed by the state—and those that other counter-
vailing considerations render unjustifiable. What justifies the protection is the idea
that religious obligations are a form of imperative moral obligations; in other words,
there seems to be a conflict of moral duties in this case.141 Although very sensitive
to the protection of freedom of religion, the Supreme Court has not gone as far as
accepting polygamy on the basis of religious belief.142
138 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972); see also Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of
Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (citing Yoder and reaffirming that only religious beliefs
are protected by the First Amendment); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
139 According to the Court, “A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with
no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.” Yoder, 406
U.S. at 224.
The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has en-
abled them to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-
imposed limitations on relations with the world, and to survive and
prosper in contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable
and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in this
country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capable of ful-
filling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without
compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeop-
ardizing their free exercise of religious belief.
Id. at 225. Mark Tushnet commented that if the Amish prevailed it is because they are a “good”
religion, an acceptable way of education in substitution to the one offered by the state. Mark
Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT.
REV. 373, 382 (1989). Geoffrey Stone noted that the Court granted preferential treatment to
the Amish “in seeming conflict with the central premise of the Court’s establishment and free
exercise jurisprudence.” Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the
Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 987 (1986). In a comparative perspective,
it is unlikely that the Amish would have prevailed in a European legal order. See, e.g.,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 29, 2003, 1 BVR
436/03, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20030429
_1bvr043603.html (refusing the right of parents to provide private religious schooling at
home to their children for religious objections to state education).
140 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
141 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
142 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court had no difficulty re-
jecting polygamy despite a free exercise claim. Id. at 166–67. It held that plural marriages
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The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is interpreted in conjunction
with the Establishment Clause as creating a very dense net of protection for freedom
of religion. According to the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, state action vio-
lates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy one of the following prongs: “First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary ef-
fect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”143
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, which concerned a Jehovah’s Witness convicted for
breach of the peace for playing an anti-Catholic record to passersby on the streets
of New Haven, Connecticut, the Court, following the distinction between belief and
act, held that even for cases concerning action a balancing test should be applied “of
the two conflicting interests”: freedom to preach against the interest in “peace and
good order.”144 The power to regulate must be so exercised as not “unduly to in-
fringe the protected freedom”; Cantwell had not made an assault or threat of bodily
harm, but had only aroused animosity with his unpopular religious views.145 The
Court insisted that the essential characteristic of religious faith and political belief
is that they provide a shield for the development of “many types of life, character,
opinion and belief,” and that this shield is all the more necessary in the U.S., “for a
people composed of many races and of many creeds.”146 Only “incite[ment to] vio-
lence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of their equal right to the
exercise of their liberties” is a transgression that can justify state punishment.147
Animosity as such cannot justify restrictions to freedom of religion.148
According to Supreme Court case law, until 1990, when a law discriminated
against religion as such it should be submitted to strict scrutiny under Sherbert v.
Verner.149 Governmental regulation that imposed a burden upon religious practice
cannot be allowed and religious beliefs cannot serve as an excuse of not abiding by this
prohibition as the professed doctrines of religious belief cannot be held superior to the law
of the land, “and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Id. at 167; see
also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347 (1890) (affirming the judgment indicting a member
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints for conspiring to register to vote in the
Idaho Territory in violation of territorial law requiring registrants to take oath that they are
not bigamists or polygamists, or “member[s] of any order, organization or association which
teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its members . . . to commit the crime of bigamy or
polygamy.”). The oath requirement could raise concerns concerning the distinction between be-
lief and conduct, as proposed by Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166;
see also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 2011).
143 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted).
144 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
145 Id. at 304, 310.
146 Id. at 310.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 311; see also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
149 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963). “Disqualification of appellant for unemployment com-
pensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would
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must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.150 If a plaintiff can
show that a law or governmental practice burdens the free exercise of religious beliefs,
the burden shifts to the government to prove that the law or practice is important to
the accomplishment of some important or “compelling” secular objective and that
it is the least restrictive means for attaining that objective.151 For the Supreme Court,
“religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”152
In these cases, the Court protected religiously motivated choices more severely than
other personal philosophical choices, an opinion that was moderated in Employment
Division v. Smith,153 in which the Court eliminated the requirement that the govern-
ment justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion
in reference to a compelling state interest.154 Under the Free Exercise Clause, neutral
laws of general applicability criminalizing behavior may be applied to religious prac-
tices even when they are not supported by a compelling governmental interest.155
The First Amendment
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of
an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is
not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise
constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act
for nonreligious reasons.156
have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden
on the free exercise of her religion.” Id. at 398. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court held for a Jehovah’s Witness
who resigned because he was transferred to a department that fabricated turrets for military
tanks because Indiana’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits violated “his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion.” Id. at 709. “Where the state conditions receipt
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such
a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists.” Id. at 717–18. In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S.
829, 832–35 (1989), the Supreme Court held that “denial of unemployment compensation
benefits . . . on the ground that [appellant’s] refusal to work on Sunday was not based on
tenets or dogma of an established religious sect violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
150 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
151 McConnell, supra note 36, at 1416–17.
152 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
153 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1933, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
154 Smith, 494 U.S. at 873.
155 Id. at 872.
156 Id.
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In this case, the use of forbidden substances in religious rituals could not be protected
in reference to the First Amendment.157 The case appears to reaffirm the principle
of equal treatment between religion and non-religion, unless, as the Court insists, the
religiously motivated action involves “the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . . .”158
Congress, by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
tried to circumvent the application of Smith by imposing anew the compelling
interest test for any violation of freedom of religion by all state and federal laws
“neutral” toward religion.159 The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the RFRA
cannot be applied to the states, developing an analysis in favor of the remedial rather
than substantive nature of the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.160
The RFRA does, however, still apply to the federal government.161 Even though the
RFRA was struck down with regard to state and local laws, many states passed laws
applying the Sherbert/Yoder compelling interest test to their own acts.162
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court repeated that Smith and following cases in
which a neutral generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster, were
“cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake” as well.163 The Court
cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, showing that the case concerned the right to the free exercise
157 Id.
158 Id. at 881.
159 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The
RFRA prohibited “government” from “substantially burdening” a person’s exercise of re-
ligion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government
can demonstrate the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.” Id. § 3. The RFRA’s mandate
applies to any branch of federal or state government, to all officials, and to other persons act-
ing under color of law. Id. § 5. Its universal coverage includes “all Federal and State law, and
the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before
or after the enactment of [the RFRA].” Id. § 6.
160 Boerne, 521. U.S. 507. The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the power of the Congress to enforce this Amendment is remedial and not
substantive. Id. at 519–20. For the Court, Congress “has been given the power ‘to enforce,’
not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. at 519.
161 Carolyn N. Lung, The Battle for Religious Freedom, in LAW AND RELIGION: CASES IN
CONTEXT 107 (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010) (noting that the statute still applies to federal
government). But see MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 142, at 193–94 (expressing concerns
about the RFRA’s scope).
162 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 622 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493, 41-
1493.01 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 652-571b (West 2011); FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 66
761.01–.05 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-4 (West 2011); 77 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 35/1–/15 (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1
to -5 (West 2011); 51 OKLA. ST. ANN. §§ 251–258 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-
80.1 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -40 (2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 110.001–.012 (West 2011).
163 Boerne, 521 U.S. 514.
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of religion as well as “the right of parents to control their children’s education.”164
For the Smith Court, “where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,
it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without com-
pelling reason.”165 However, “neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to re-
ligious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”166
In a posterior case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah,
the Court ruled that laws that are not neutral or of general application and that bur-
den a religious practice must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny: they “must be jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.”167 That case indicates disapproval of animus against a specific religious
view or practice. Therefore, ordinances prohibiting religious killings of animals “for
any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be
consumed,”168 but excluding almost all other animal killings, must meet this criterion.
The crucial element for the Court was whether “the object or purpose of a law is the
suppression of religion or religious conduct.”169 For the Court, “[a] law lacks facial
neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from
the language or context.”170 The Court further recognized that “[a]ll laws are selective
to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has
the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.”171 The ordinances under exami-
nation could not withstand strict scrutiny, as they were not narrowly tailored to accom-
plish the asserted governmental interests of protecting public health and preventing
cruelty to animals.172 They were overbroad or under-inclusive.173 “[W]here . . . gov-
ernment restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact fea-
sible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm
of the same sort, the governmental interests given in justification of the restriction can-
not be regarded as compelling.”174 The Free Exercise Clause still “forbids subtle de-
partures from neutrality”175 and “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.”176
164 Id.
165 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
166 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (discussing Smith).
167 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993).
168 Id. at 527.
169 Id. at 533.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 542.
172 Id. at 542–46.
173 Id. at 546–47.
174 Id. In this case, with regard to preventing cruelty to animals, “the ordinances [were]
drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.” Id. at 543.
With regard to the city’s interest in public health, the statute was underinclusive because it did
not prohibit nonreligious killing or disposal after killing. Id. at 544–45. The statue was also un-
derinclusive with regard to the health risk posed by consumption of uninspected meat. Id. at 545.
175 Id. at 534 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
176 Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986)).
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The French law banning the covering of one’s face in public places, although
enunciated as a law of a general applicability and seems to be a prima facie neutral
law, was construed and aimed at a specific religious practice. It is reminiscent of the
facts of the Church of Lukumi case: animus against a specific religion.177 Therefore,
a justification of the protection of a compelling interest would be indispensable. In
Abington School District v. Schempp, the Supreme Court ruled that whether a law
constitutes an establishment of religion or a violation of religious freedom is largely
a function of whether the legislature intended to aid or hinder religion.178 For John
Hart Ely, what justifies control of the courts is whether the majority of the decision
makers of the legislative body “were moved by an unconstitutional criterion of se-
lection in making the choice in issue.”179 The French law aims at specific religious
beliefs, whose religious character the decision-makers negate describing them as
“political.”180 As a federal court ruled following the Church of Lukumi case, “A find-
ing of mere facial neutrality, does not end the inquiry. To pass constitutional muster
a governmental law or policy must also be neutral in purpose and effect.”181 For a sim-
ilar law in the United States clearly aiming to limit the practices of a specific religion,
courts would have to examine if other countervailing considerations would justify
it. The protection of national security for very narrowly defined circumstances and
identity control would most likely be the only justifications that federal courts in the
United States would accept to uphold it.
The law would be very likely considered by United States courts under the doc-
trine of “hybrid rights.” According to this doctrine, “two constitutional claims, each
of which would be insufficient on its own, require strict or at least heightened scru-
tiny when combined in a single action.”182 Freedom of expression weighs heavily in
this case. The Smith Court allowed for this possibility, citing numerous cases in which
177 Id. at 579.
178 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)
(discussing and quoting Schempp).
179 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1268 (1970). Ely notes, however, that “in discretionary choice situations . . .
when an unconstitutionally motivated choice can be . . . defended in terms of a legitimately
defensible difference, motivation should not be considered.” Id. at 1274. An apparel reg-
ulation in schools for example, even if it might be motivated by an unconstitutional moti-
vation, if it “can be justified in terms of health[, it] is amenable to rational evaluation and
defense . . . .” Id. Thus, finding “a rational and . . . inoffensive explanation for a choice . . .
render[s] impossible a judicial finding of unconstitutional motivation.” Id. at 1275.
180 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 89. For a presentation of the relevant debates
inside French civil society, see ANNA KORTEWEG & GÖKCE YURDAKUL, THE HEADSCARF
DEBATE: CONFLICTS OF BELONGING IN NATIONAL NARRATIVES (2012).
181 Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1553 (D. Neb. 1996) (citing Church of Lukumi,
508 U.S. at 531–32).
182 MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 142, at 174. The doctrine was criticized in Kissinger
v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
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the Court held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally ap-
plicable law to religiously motivated action when the Free Exercise Clause is at stake
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and
of the press.183 The promotion of gender equality is certainly an important interest,
however, because dress choice as self-expression is concerned, the expressive ele-
ments would likely outweigh other governmental interests. In Cohen v. California,
the general interest for security and the authority of the military did not outweigh
the expressive interest of the person wearing the jacket criticizing both the Vietnam
War and the draft.184 The fact that the burka is often self-imposed relativizes the
justification that the prohibition aims to protect women from the physical or psycho-
logical violence of men.185
Concerning the right of litigants to wear religious headscarves in courtrooms,
a federal district court referred to the Smith precedent to dismiss a damages action
against a judge who had asked the plaintiff to take off her veil during the hearing of
a small claim action.186 The court held that “the right to free exercise of religion does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of
general applicability.”187 In a more recent decision the same court did not consider
the free exercise of religion claim of the plaintiff, because the headscarf “could have
been mistaken for a fashion accessory” and the plaintiff removed her hijab without
hesitation when asked—thus, her conduct and comments undermined her ability to
meet the plaintiff’s burden to show an injury in fact.188
183 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who
refused on religious grounds to send their children to school); Follett v. McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on
solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations
under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed
nonreligious); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (acknowledging the right of
parents to direct the education of their children). The Court also cited “cases prohibiting
compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech grounds, [which] have also
involved freedom of religion. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating
compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); West
Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag
salute statute challenged by religious objectors).” Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
184 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
185 Steve Hendrix, The Few U.S. Muslim Women Who Choose Full Veil Face Mix of
Harassment, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/the-few-us-muslim-women-who-choose-full-veil-face-mix-of-harassment-sympathy
/2011/04/13/AFLrwzYD_story.html.
186 Muhammad v. Paruk, 553 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
187 Id.
188 Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Mich. v. Callahan, No. 09-13372, 2010 WL 1754780,
at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2010).
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A law, like the one adopted in France, banning the hijab for students in schools
would most likely be considered unconstitutional in the United States.189 A district
court issued a consent order in the case of a sixth-grade girl who had been barred
from wearing her hijab to school.190 The court held that the girl was allowed to wear her
hijab at school and the school district was obligated to accommodate the religious
needs of other children and amend its dress code.191 According to federal case law,
bans on religious symbols on school premises violate students’ First Amendment
rights of free speech and free exercise.192 The Supreme Court has held that “students or
teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”193 “[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression . . . [since] [a]ny vari-
ation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.”194 For the Court, only conduct
that would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school,” would sustain a prohibition on speech.195
Although federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of dress codes and “no
hats” policies for students in schools submitting them to intermediate scrutiny,196
189 See Jennifer M. Westerfield, Behind the Veil: An American Legal Perspective on the
European Headscarf Debate, 54 AM. J. COMP. L., 637, 661–62 (2006).
190 Consent Order, Hearn v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist. 020, No: CIV 03-598-S (E.D. Okla.
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec_topics/religiousdiscrimination/hearn
_consent_decree_final.pdf.
191 Id.
192 Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding
that the school district’s dress code regulation barring rosaries worn on the outside of
clothing violated the First Amendment).
193 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However,
schools can prohibit “sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.” Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). Schools can also regulate school-sponsored speech. Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988). In Morse v. Frederick, the Court
determined that schools can prohibit speech “advocating illegal drug use.” 551 U.S. 393, 410
(2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
194 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
195 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
196 So long as the regulation is viewpoint- and content-neutral, courts will assess whether
the dress code “furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the interest is
unrelated to the suppression of student expression; and if the incidental restrictions on [free
speech] are no more [restrictive] than . . . necessary to [further] that interest.” Canady v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Because (1) choice of clothing is personal expression that happens to
occur on the school premises and (2) The School Board’s uniform
policy is unrelated to any viewpoint, a level of scrutiny should apply in
this case that is higher than the standard in Kuhlmeier, but less strin-
gent than the school official’s burden in Tinker.
Id.; see also Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1055 (2010). The Palmer court noted that “Canady has been followed by
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they have also held that in cases of headgear, which constitutes speech and represents
exercise of religion, students have “‘hybrid’ constitutional protection arising out of
both the free speech and free exercise,” thus meriting strict scrutiny.197 Conspicuous
religious symbols are protected, whereas political conspicuous messages on T-shirts,
for example, are not protected in schools.198 Prohibition of covering the face in schools
could be justified only if proven that it bars the “‘personal intercommunication among
students’ necessary to an effective educational process,”199 as well as to ensure order in
a school with concrete demonstration of fears of disorder (e.g., from gangs), provided
that the students have other means of individual expression.200
The question of whether state employees are authorized to wear signs of religious
affiliation while in service is still open in the United States. In some cases the question
appeared as an issue of discrimination on the grounds of religion in the access to
employment forbidden under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, in accordance with Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.201 The law applies to the federal government and anticipates
three other circuits . . . .” Id. at 508; see, e.g., Bar-Navon v. Brevard Cnty. Sch. Bd., 290 F.
App’x 273, 276–77 (11th Cir. 2008); Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 428–32
(9th Cir. 2008);Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 390–93 (6th Cir. 2005).
Further, Canady “has effectively become the national standard for analyzing content-neutral
student speech.” Palmer, 579 F.3d at 508.
197 Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard Cnty., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338 (D. Md. 1999). For a
commentary, see Anita L. Allen, Hijabs and Headwraps: The Case for Tolerance, in FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE WORLD 115–27 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010). Canady also allows
for a different outcome in case of interference with the right to free exercise of religion.
Canady, 240 F.3d at 444 n.5.
198 See Sistare, supra note 19, at 142 (highlighting these inconsistencies).
199 Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720 (E.D. Ark. 2007)
(quoting Canady, 240 F.3d at 443).
200 Federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of a school uniform policy if it “does
not foreclose all means of individual expression” such as bracelets wristbands and armbands.
Lowry, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 719. “[S]o long as a dress code . . . provides [students] with some
means to communicate their speech during school,” it is a restriction that is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of the school’s interests. Palmer, 579 F.3d at 513.
201 The statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (alteration in original).
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its effect on state laws.202 The statute foresees an exemption to its application for “a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.”203 Employees have a right to have their re-
ligious needs accommodated if this does not create an “undue hardship” on the
employer.204 For police departments, a federal court of appeals ruled that reasonable
accommodation can be obligatory under Title VII.205 For teachers in public schools,
only two states—Pennsylvania and Nebraska—maintain laws that ban religious
202 § 2000e-7 provides:
Effect on State laws.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any
present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other
than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
Despite the holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court
has held that Congress has more authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
when issues of discrimination and rights submitted to heightened scrutiny are at stake such
as issues of discrimination. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nevada Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). For further analysis of this, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 233–35 (4th ed. 2011).
203 § 2000e-2(e).
204 § 2000e(j). (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommo-
date to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”). The European Union Directive,
on the other hand, does not contain an explicit reference to the possibility of reasonable ac-
commodation of religious practices. See Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 118.
205 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that the police department is obliged to tolerate the beard of Muslim police officers).
But see Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 260 (2009) (holding that the requested
religious accommodation posed undue hardship to the police department and distinguishing
Fraternal Order of Police). An intermediate level of scrutiny applied in Fraternal Order of
Police, compared to Smith and Church of Lukumi which require a compelling reason, be-
cause it arose in the public employment context. Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 366
n.7. As for accommodation in the military, the Court has held that “[i]nstinctive obedience,
unity, commitment and esprit de corps” are goals of the military, which differentiate it from
the civilian state. Goldman v. Weinberger, 457 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). Without rendering the
guarantees of the First Amendment entirely nugatory, these aspects of military life justify
“deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the importance of
military interest”; thus, dress regulations that do not permit the wearing of religious apparel,
such a yarmulke, are not prohibited by the First Amendment. Id. In 1987, however, Congress
amended Section 774 of Title 10 of the United States Code allowing the wearing of items of
religious apparel while in uniform with two exceptions: “(1) in circumstances with respect
to which the Secretary determines that the wearing of the item would interfere with the per-
formance of the member’s military duties; or (2) if the Secretary determines, under regu-
lations under subsection (c), that the item of apparel is not neat and conservative.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 774(b) (2006).
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garb206 and similar regulations have been sustained in two others—New York207
and New Mexico208—while challenges to the toleration of religious dress in the
classroom, rather than to rules forbidding such dress, have been rejected in five
other states.209 The more recent federal case law indicates a split on the issue. For
instance, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled, in United States v. Board
of Education, that Pennsylvania’s Garb Statute banning religious attire for teachers
was “important to the maintenance of an atmosphere of religious neutrality in the
classroom.”210 More recently, however, the District Court for the Western District
206 NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-898 (2011); PA. STAT. ANN. 24 § 11-1112 (2011). However, the
General Assembly of Pennsylvania has proposed an amendment to section 11-1112, which
would repeal that section; the amendment was referred to the Committee on Education in
May 2011. H.B. 1581, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).
207 O’Connor v. Hendrick, 77 N.E. 612 (N.Y. 1906) (holding that control over the habili-
ments of teachers is essential to the proper management of public schools).
208 Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949, 964–65 (N.M. 1951) (noting that if religious persons are
“employed as teachers in . . . public schools they must not dress in religious garb or wear
religious emblems”).
209 See e.g., City of New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 43 A.2d 455, 458–59 (Conn. 1945)
(holding that the wearing of religious garb by teachers does not affect nonsectarianism of
school if the school is under public control and “free from secular instruction.”); Johnson v.
Boyd, 28 N.E.2d 256, 266 (Ind. 1940) (“[M]embership in any particular church can neither legal-
ly qualify nor disqualify a teacher” from teaching in public school, even if they wear the dress
of their religious orders because it does not belong to “the courts to decide [if] the cut of a
man’s coat or the color of a woman’s gown is sectarian teaching, because they indicate sectar-
ian belief.”); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956). In Rawlings, the court stated that
while the dress and emblems worn by these Sisters proclaim them to
be members of certain organizations of the Roman Catholic Church
and that they have taken certain religious vows, these facts do not
deprive them of their right to teach in public schools, so long as they
do not inject religion or the dogma of their church. The garb does not
teach. It is the woman within who teaches. The dress of the Sisters
denotes modesty, unworldliness and an unselfish life . . . .
Rawlings, 290 S.W.2d at 804.
The court also noted that “[i]f they were prevented from teaching in the public schools
because of their religious beliefs, then they would be denied equal protection of the law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” Id. (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)); see also, e.g., Gerhardt v. Heid, 267 N.W. 127 (N.D.
1936) (noting that the wearing of religious habit and contributing a large portion of earnings
to the order of which the teachers are members does not convert the school into a sectarian
school, provided that the teachers do not seek to impress their own religious beliefs while act-
ing as teachers); Moore v. Bd. of Educ., 212 N.E.2d 833, 841 (Ohio Misc. 1965) (providing
that in the absence of statute or regulation religious garb may be worn by teachers in public
schools “so long as they do not inject religion or the dogma of their church” (quoting
Rawlings, 290 S.W.2d at 804)).
210 911 F.2d 882, 894 (3d Cir. 1990). For the court, reasonable accommodation would
impose “an undue hardship [to] require [the] school board to violate an apparently valid crim-
inal statute [banning the religious attire,] thereby exposing its administrators to criminal prose-
cution and the possible consequences thereof.” Id. at 891. The mandatory Garb Statute provided
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of Pennsylvania held that “it is unlikely that the Garb Statute would withstand the
heightened scrutiny and endorsement analysis to which it now must be subjected”
under the First Amendment.211 Distinguishing its ruling, the district court noted
that the court in Board of Education “was not faced with, and did not address, any
Establishment Clause challenge”: the “subsequent doctrinal developments” in the
First Amendment precedent of the Supreme Court following Employment Division
v. Smith impose state neutrality between religious and non-religious symbolic
expression.212 “A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses [imposes state] neutrality toward religion, favoring neither one religion over
others nor religious adherents collectively over non-adherents”213: the statute vio-
lated the neutrality policy, discriminating between religion and non-religion, because
secular “employees may publicly display and express other secular messages through
jewelry, dress, insignia and emblems while [teaching].”214 Balancing the interest of
the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern with the in-
terest of the state as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services,
the court found that the plaintiff’s wearing of a cross was not been disruptive, dis-
tracting or confusing to students.215 If this judgment applies to the Christian cross, the
principle of equal treatment among religions makes it applicable also to headscarves.
The degree of visibility of the religious sign is not a factor that should affect the
exercise of a fundamental right. The debate of whether the free exercise of religious
expression would justify a reasonable accommodation or a ban for signs of religious
affiliation for teachers is still open.216
In 2006, a federal court ruled in favor of reasonable accommodation for identity
control for a Muslim woman wearing a burka in narrowly defined circumstances.217
The requirement to remove the burka from obstructing the view of the face while
having one’s picture taken for driver’s license was found not to be a “substantial
a Title VII defense to the religious discrimination and failure to accommodate. Id. at 886.
The case was criticized as being in tension with antidiscrimination legislation. See Holly M.
Bastian, Case Comment, Religious Garb Statutes and Title VII: An Uneasy Coexistence, 80
GEO. L.J. 211 (1991).
211 Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 555 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(granting a preliminary injunction).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 549 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
214 Id. at 552.
215 Id. Although “[e]lementary school children as a group are more impressionable than
high school or college students, . . . [this] is not a sufficient reason for discriminating against
the First Amendment rights of [elementary school] employees unless the employees are
doing something that is likely to influence the students by exploiting their impressionability.”
Id. at 553.
216 For further discussion of this debate generally, see KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD
BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2005).
217 Freeman v. Dep’t. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
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burden,” provided that the Department of Highway Safety “would accommodate
[the applicant’s] veiling beliefs by using a female photographer with no other person
present.”218 Identity control is a legitimate reason for not allowing covering of the
face: the United States Department of State requires that hats and headcoverings be
removed for passport photos, unless worn daily for a religious purpose, provided
that they allow visibility of the face.219
II. UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY220
A. Role of the State
1. The French “Rational” Republic . . .
The Report of the French National Assembly justifies the necessity of the burka
ban in order to guarantee the authenticity of the will of the women wearing it.221
Referring to Discours sur la Servitude Volontaire by Étienne de la Boétie,222 the
Report stresses the need to protect the women from themselves, seeing their will to
wear the burka as “alienated” from a normative conception of what this will should
be.223 However, this normative conception of what constitutes the “proper” exercise
of one’s liberty is imposed by the state. Is this a satisfactory justification of the le-
gitimacy of the state to define whether a specific exercise of the liberty of self-defi-
nition associated with the freedom of conscience is “real” or not? At the origins of
understanding religious freedom, which have lead to the burka ban, is the doctrine
of the reason of the state, a specific conception of French republicanism, and the role
of the state concerning the definition of the content of liberty.
The burka ban, like the hijab ban in public schools in France, is justified by the
need to protect the girls wearing a burka from social pressure when the choice to wear
it is not authentically theirs.224 It also aims at protecting them from themselves when
wearing the burka happens to be an authentic choice of the women concerned.225
This exercise of human liberty is considered as inappropriate, as based on the “wrong”
218 Id. at 56.
219 Frequently Asked Questions, Photo Requirement, DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state
.gov/passport/pptphotoreq/photofaq/photofaq_5291.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
220 For preliminary analysis of the philosophy which constitutes the background under-
standing of republicanism on the imaginary level in France and in the United States, see
Tourkochoriti, supra note 22.
221 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 22.
222 See ÉTIENNE DE LA BOÉTIE, THE POLITICS OF OBEDIENCE: THE DISCOURSE OF
VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE (Harry Kurz trans., 1975) (1574).
223 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 43. The Report refers to the hearing of
Abdennour Bidar, a philosopher, using the terms “alienated subjectivities or liberties.” Id.
224 Id. at 13, 22, 128.
225 Id. at 22.
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reasons. The state is permitted to intervene in order to protect what constitutes the
“real” liberty of the individuals. State intervention is based on the paradoxical as-
sumption that only the state can define the proper content of religious liberty. That
assumption indicates trust towards the state as the competent agent par excellence to
assure that liberty is real and does not remain an empty form. Ever since the French
Revolution, the metaphysic universalism of the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen went together with a conception of the role of the state as
charged with the mission to guarantee the effective exercise of liberty. According
to this conception, the state is trusted with the mission to guarantee not only the pro-
tection of negative liberty, but also the protection of positive liberty.226 Positive lib-
erty is understood here in the political sense: from the point of view of the ability
of the actor to participate in the political sphere and in political decision making, as
well as a social right, as the necessity for the state to guarantee the preconditions and
presupposition of positive and negative liberties, so that liberty becomes substantive
and does not remain an empty form, a fiction deprived of essential content according
to the famous Marxist critique.227 The mission of the state would thus be to guaran-
tee negative liberty, as well as the preconditions for the exercise of negative liberty.
There is also another meaning of positive liberty, a moral meaning228 associated to
the power of self-determination; in this sense, dominating oneself means exercising
one’s reason in conformity with one’s superior and autonomous self. All of these
conceptions of “positive” liberty were omnipresent at the moment of the French
Revolution. The idea of rights, which were later called “social,” was omnipresent
at the moment of the foundation, as was the idea that the state has a moralizing role
and is the agent par excellence that can guarantee that citizens exercise their reason
in conformity with their superior and autonomous self.
The justification of the burka ban—to protect the women wearing it from
themselves—begs the question of whether the reason of the state is superior to the
reason of the individual. According to the French conception, the state is permitted
to impose the “proper” use of reason. This conception has its origins in the older
doctrine of the “reason of the state”: the semantic proximity corresponds to a spe-
cific conception of the role of the state, which emerged during the religious wars.229
The political structure of the contemporary French state towards religion emerged
out of the need of the monarchy to affirm itself upon religious disagreements.230 The
226 For a general discussion on negative and positive liberty, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 169–81 (Henry Hardy ed. 2002) (1969).
227 There are numerous instances where Marx discusses the distinction between real and
formal liberty. See, e.g., KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER,
supra note 49, at 27–52; KARL MARX, THE CAPITAL (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976).
228 See BERLIN, supra note 226, at 178–79.
229 Marcel Gauchet, L’État au Miroir de la Raison d’État: La France et la Chrétienté, in
RAISON ET DÉRAISON D’ÉTAT: THÉORICIENS ET THÉORIES DE LA RAISON D’ÉTAT AUX XVIIe
ET XVIIe SIÈCLES 193–244 (Yves Charles Zarka ed., 1994).
230 Id.
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emergence of the doctrine of the “reason of the state,” just like the doctrine of the
“divine right” of kings, is the state response to the irrationality of religious conflict,231
which led to the Thirty Years War. A similar program of strict separation of church
and state was realized by the Constituent Assembly in 1790 with the civil constitution
of the clergy, which, although abolishing monarchy, accomplished the monarchy’s
designs.232 The separation of church and state is accomplished through the attribution
of a strong spiritual power upon the temporal power: the state should have a morality
independent from religion and at the same time it should have moral supremacy
towards all religions.233 “Theocracy is reborn as ideocracy.”234
Another important factor is the fascination concerning the collective power in
France, which has been marked by the heritage of absolutism. The French legal and
political order is dominated by an ex ante understanding of an organic unity between
the state and civil society, which has its origin in the metaphysical conception of the
same unity between the royalty and its subjects. At the moment the Revolution took
place, there was only a reconceptualization of the role of power without any qualita-
tive change in the extent of its authority upon society.235 Although the exercise of
individual rights is recognized, in parallel the content and the limits of these rights
will be defined by the new political authority, the Parliament, which substitutes itself
in place of the royal authority.236 The Parliament expresses from now on the impartial
point of view, the idea of the general will that Rousseau talks about. Public authority,
far from being a threat to liberty, according to the Anglo-Saxon model, is trusted to re-
alize the possibility of men to constitute themselves as human beings and citizens.237
Citizenship and independence, instead of being contradictory, validate each other and
a human being is elevated to the dignity of a human being through being a citizen.238
By distancing oneself from the details that define one’s existence and elevating one-
self to the point of view of universality, a citizen leads a meaningful and liberating life.
231 GAUCHET, supra note 25, at 32–33; Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2561, 2566 (2009).
232 GAUCHET, supra note 25, at 36.
233 Id. at 39–45.
234 Id. at 59.
235 For more history and analysis of the French Revolution, see generally FRANÇOIS FURET,
INTERPRETING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Elborg Forster trans., 1981) (translating FRANÇOIS
FURET, PENSER LA REVOLUTION FRANÇAISE (1978)); JAUME, supra note 32; LUCIEN JAUME, LE
DISCOURS JACOBIN ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (1989); and PIERRE ROSANVALLON, LA DÉMOCRATIE
INACHEVÉE: HISTOIRE DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ DU PEUPLE EN FRANCE (2000).
236 FURET, supra note 235, at 199–200.
237 Id. at 200.
238 “[W]e do not . . . begin to become men [but only after having] been Citizens.” JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Geneva Manuscript (First Version of Social Contract), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 81 (Roger D. Masters et al. eds., Judith R. Bush et al.
trans., 1994) (translating JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL, MANUSCRIT DE
GENÉVE, OEUVRES COMPLÈTES (1967)). Therefore, it is being a citizen that makes one a man
according to Rousseau. Id.
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The dignity associated with the quality of being a citizen meant that particular
interests can be heard only if they can be reformulated in the language of the general
interest. The Chapelier Law, prohibiting associations,239 can be understood as pre-
venting the formation of collectivities, which form strong social authorities giving
way to a competing legitimacy in opposition to the legitimacy of the political au-
thority and thus constituting a threat of partiality. Religious affiliations are particu-
larly threatening due to the intense allegiance of religious beliefs, which can lead to
strong collectivities in opposition to the political authority. Today, this version of
republicanism has been modified and politics in search of its own legitimacy must
legitimize religion in view of the search of meaning.240
Another element that defined the conception of the state in France was the struggle
against inequality of wealth and privilege during the French Revolution. This struggle
led to the emergence of the idea (also operating upon the ideological presupposition
of an organic unity between the state and its citizens) that a society that wants to
think of itself as composed of individuals cannot remain indifferent to the absence
in one of its members of the autonomy which constitutes her as individual.241 In this
way, society conflicts with its own aim to produce individuals with potential for
independence.242 The French Revolution aimed at consecrating not only the procla-
mation of negative liberty but also the consecration of positive liberty, in the sense
of “effective” liberty. The need to establish a new “political sociability,”243 abolishing
a hierarchically organized society and establishing true equality, was another cause
of the French Revolution, which aimed at abolishing a morally corrupt society
organized in concentric spheres around the king and had a profoundly moralizing
role aiming at regenerating humanity. The French revolutionaries were led to the
impasse of the Terror, in attempting to impose an a priori ideal of morality upon a
civil society, which was not ready for it.244 The integral democracy as applied by the
Jacobins led to the antithesis of what it pretended to be, to a totalitarian regime, which
completely absorbed the private man in the citizen245 in its attempt to assure moral
transparency and to resolve the social question. The destruction of individuality and the
absorption of the individual in the citizen in the attempt to establish the domination
of truth on earth and to guarantee effective equality of all indicate the failure to solve
239 Le Chapelier Law, GEORGE MASON UNIV., ROY ROSENZWEIG CTR. FOR HISTORY &
NEW MEDIA, http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/370/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (citing JOHN
HALL STEWART, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 165–66 (1951))
(enacted by the French National Assembly on June 14, 1791, the law was repealed partially
in 1864 and 1884.).
240 GAUCHET, supra note 25, at 103–10.
241 MARCEL GAUCHET, LA RÉVOLUTION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 99–100 (1989).
242 Id.
243 FURET, supra note 235, at 37.
244 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 355–63 (A.V. Miller trans. 1977). For an
analysis, see Robert Legros, Hegel Entre Lumières et Romantisme, 16 CAHIERS DE PHILOSOPHIE
POLITIQUE ET JURIDIQUE 143, 156 (1989).
245 JAUME, supra note 235.
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this problem. The difficulty in responding to the social question and the necessity to
provide for the equal dignity of all led to political instability in France throughout the
nineteenth century.246
The text of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is
marked by a universalist idealism with a fascination for collective power that should
be redistributed and recomposed.247 The need to transcend the oppressive immanence
of the Ancien Régime rendered indispensable the idealistic point of view of the French
revolutionaries.248 The sanction of the positive law in the Declaration of Rights was
indispensable to this effort of regeneration and radical inversion of any value of the
Ancien Régime. This high level of idealization basically meant that liberty was under-
stood in the metaphysical sense as the foundation of the empirical determination of
rights, including all the different meanings of rights, which evolved in the later dis-
tinction of “negative” and “positive,” that is “political” and third generation “social”
rights.249 The French Revolution led to the elevation on the level of the law of the
liberty that a human being has to be a human being, but it is the affirmation of being a
citizen that leads to affirm oneself as being human.250 The fact that the rights of man
were declared at the same time as the rights of the citizen is not a simple coincidence.
It affects their declaration and the meaning of the state’s engagement to provide for
them: the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is essentially a civic or
political act, which means that the essential realm of their affirmation is the political
realm.251 The French Declaration safeguards natural rights, which are seen by def-
inition as social, defined in reference to equality.252 Therefore, although the French
Declaration is inspired by the individualist current that stresses the need to guarantee
the imprescriptible rights of the individual, it simultaneously associates them with po-
litical expression that stresses their social basis: rights do not exist outside society, they
are bound to the person as a political subject.253 The logic of the French Declaration
assures a correspondence between the rights of the individual and social authority,
246 ROSANVALLON, supra note 235.
247 GAUCHET, supra note 241, at 46–47.
248 The ideality and universality of the human rights discourse in France comes, for Hegel,
from the necessity to negate the particular “non-law” of privileges. See, e.g., BERNARD
BOURGEOIS, PHILOSOPHIE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME, DE KANT Á MARX 82 (1990); HEGEL,
supra note 54, at 447; Bernard Bourgeois, Hegel, in DICTIONNAIRE DE PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE
267–74 (Philippe Raynaud & Stéphane Rials eds., 1996).
249 Although the conceptual distinction between the three categories of rights emerged
later, the question of “assistance” to those in need was key in the revolutionary era. LUC FERRY
& ALAIN RENAUT, PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE 3 DES DROITS DE L’HOMME Á L’IDÉE REPUBLICAINE
185–86 (1984).
250 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
251 BERNARD BOURGEOIS, LA RAISON MODERNE ET LE DROIT POLITIQUE, 121–22 (2000).
252 HEGEL, supra note 54, at 463. For further analysis, see JOACHIM RITTER, HEGEL AND
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 26 (Richard Dien Winfield trans., 1982). See also BOURGEOIS,
supra note 248; Simone Goyard-Fabre, Les Lumières Ont-Elles Préparé la Révolution?, 16
CAHIERS DE PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE ET JURIDIQUE 23 (1989).
253 HEGEL, supra note 54, at 463.
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rather than a sharing between the two.254 For the French, the rights of society are the
ones by which the rights of the individual exist and not the other way around.
Thus, in opposition to the dominant spirit in American political development,
private liberty is, for the French, to be affirmed and realized through mediation by
public authority. The realization of liberty takes place through the state because, ac-
cording to the French conception, the relation that each person maintains with herself
is mediated by the state. The concern to provide for the “realization” of rights com-
bined with the conception of the “rational republic” leads to the acceptance of overde-
termination, by the state, of the conditions of the realization of liberty. If collective
power is in itself something positive, once liberated by its usurpers, it can have only
a positive impact upon society. The French conception of liberty makes the absorption
of powers, in the unity of the collective sovereign, the instrument of the positive en-
largement of the rights of the individual.255 The substitution to the royalty of another
imaginary and transcendent entity, the General Will, supposed to be expressing reason,
is equivalent to accepting the role of this will as par excellence competent to define
the limits and the content of liberty, and to define the relation that each person has with
herself, according to an inversed conception of the autonomy of the subject. This
realization of “real” liberty seems to be somehow antinomical, because the agent of
realization of rights is the authoritative and constraining structure of the state. The
organic association between the state and society, which marked the political imag-
inary in France, justifies the oppression of a part of the members of society in order to
impose this “real” conception of the proper sense of a “human being,” this “dignity”
that is conceived as transcending the human beings whose quality it is.
In France, the state is invested with the task of realizing the reason of the citizens,
because they are considered incapable of realizing it by themselves. The conception
of the state in France is, as an entity charged with the moral duty of purifying and ren-
dering human beings into citizens, that is, helping them attain the dignity which is
in conformity to their “nature.” This legitimizes the state to intervene in order to
define the positive content of liberty in the sense that Isaiah Berlin attributes to the
term in his essay, Two Concepts of Liberty,256 associating it to the power of self-
determination; here, dominating oneself means exercising one’s reason in confor-
mity to one’s superior and autonomous self. In France, the conception of the need to
protect human dignity as a guarantee of the necessities of human existence, as well
as the proper moral status inside society, is often associated with the positive moral
role of the state which would liberate individuals form their poverty as well as from
their own “irrationality.” The French Revolution reveals a conflicting structure of
rationality—an authoritarian rationality—that, by assigning to the idea of liberty
an “objective” value, negates the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of
modernity: the possibility of the subject to judge for herself and by herself. The
254 GAUCHET, supra note 241, at 124.
255 Id. at 46–47.
256 BERLIN, supra note 226.
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state, seen as incarnating reason and prudence, integrally absorbs the rationalism of
the individual.257 In other words, echoing Rousseau, citizens can be “forced to be free”
if they disagree with what the impartial point of view dictates or the point of view of
the general will.258 However, as the burka ban shows, the impartial point of view is
expressed by the will of the power holders at the moment, the representative democ-
racy and its majoritarian decision-making processes, which can be to the detriment
of the protection of minorities.
2. . . . Versus the American Natural Rights Republic
If the French Revolution aimed to regenerate humanity and establish a new idea
of reason and justice among men, the American Revolution aimed to constitute a
new form of independent government in rupture of the bond of allegiance to the
British Crown and not to modify the existing social structure. The only important
innovation of the American Revolution took place on the international level through
the establishment of the new republic through the “illocutionary force”259 of the fun-
damental texts. In the United States, the basic political problem was the guarantee of
the negative aspect of self-government against laws enacted by the British Parliament
in which the American colonies were not represented.260 In France, the fascination with
collective power means that it is seen as the agent par excellence in position to realize
effective liberty and equality. In the United States, on the contrary, the definition of
the utility of power is associated with the determination of its limits. Power is con-
sidered to be an instrument that society needs in order to preserve security and neg-
ative liberty. This power is limited by not having the possibility to intervene if society
is capable of accomplishing a task by itself.
The Declaration of Independence aimed to defend the negative aspect of the lib-
erty of self-government and to remind the English that it was violating the traditional
English liberties of the colonies.261 The import of the American Framers consisted
257 The “cult of reason” during the Jacobin era confirms this general attitude. See FRANÇOIS
ALPHONSE AULARD, LE CULTE DE LA RAISON ET LE CULTE DE L’ÊTRE SUPRÊME (1793–1794),
ESSAI HISTORIQUE (1975) (1892).
258 ROUSSEAU, supra note 238, at 141.
259 J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 100 (1962) (using “illocutionary force”
as the force of a speech act in the specific context of communication).
260 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 83
(1993). The Continental Congress noted that lack of representation in the British Parliament
was “in violation of their undoubted rights and liberties.” Id.; see also 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
Colonial Charters and Laws Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
50 (1971) (noting that the colonists were clearly “subject to the overriding authority of the
British government” and that the laws of the colonies “were weak bulwarks behind which
to defend the rights of Americans against the mother country”).
261 The intellectual antecedents of these rights can be found in the Magna Carta, where
“the germ of the root principle that there are fundamental rights . . . which the State . . . may
not infringe.” 1 SCHWARTZ, Magna Carta 1215, Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
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of foreseeing mechanisms ensuring the enforcement of the documents consecrating
the protection of fundamental rights and limiting the action of the government.262 By
note 260, at 4. As Schwartz notes, although the Magna Carta was initially “directed against
specific feudal abuses committed by the King against his tenants-in-chief, its important pro-
visions are cast in broader terms,” independently from the intentions of its framers. Id. at 6.
It thus obtained the meaning of “protect[ing] the personal liberty and property of all therein
by giving security from arbitrary imprisonment and arbitrary spoliation.” Id. at 7 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Petition of Right enacted by the Parliament in 1628 also
contained similar protections. The Agreement of the People of 1649 laid down limits to the
Parliament, which “anticipated directly the prohibitionary provisions of the American
Constitutions” consolidated in the Federal Bill of Rights. 1 SCHWARTZ, Agreement of the
People, 1649 Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 22. The Agreement of
the People also sets forth a principle of freedom of religion. Id. at 23. The “sections of the Bill
of Rights which deal with the perversions of justice by the last Stuart Kings . . . were to serve
as the models for” the Eighth Amendment in the American Bill of Rights. 1 SCHWARTZ, Bill
of Rights 1689 Commentary, supra note 260, at 41.
262 1 SCHWARTZ, Agreement of the People, 1649 Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 260, at 23. “[T]he Colonial Charters played an important part in the constitutional
training of Americans.” 1 SCHWARTZ, Colonial Charters and Laws, Commentary, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 49. “[T]he rights enumerated in [the Bill of Rights] are
enforceable by the Courts . . . [a] development [which came] during the latter part of the
Colonial period and [which] culminate[d] in the movement to set up enforceable Constitutions
that characterized the Revolutionary period.” 1 SCHWARTZ, First Charter of Virginia, 1606
Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 54. The Charter of Virginia protected
for the residents of the Colony “all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities . . . to all Intents
and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realm of England,” 1
SCHWARTZ, Colonial Charters and Laws, Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260,
at 49. Although the Charters “were accorded as a matter of privilege and grace,” the colonists
“looked upon [them] as the written source of their basic institutions and freedoms and were
quick to oppose any infringements upon their Charter rights.” Id. at 50–51. A core of negative
liberties which should be protected against the Executive were present in the Colonial Charters.
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 contained many of the fundamental liberties,
which were later to be protected in the Federal Bill of Rights, such as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 2 guaranteeing that every person “shall enjoy
the same justice and law”). MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641), reprinted in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 72. Maryland was the first American colony to recognize
freedom of conscience with the Act Concerning Religion in 1649. 1 SCHWARTZ, Maryland
Act Concerning Religion, 1649 Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 90.
Although in 1692 “Maryland became a royal province and the Church of England was officially
established in 1702[,] . . . religious toleration [was practiced widely and progressively became]
one of the cornerstones of the American system.” Id. at 91. The first time religious liberty was
guaranteed in the organic law of a colony was in the Charter of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations, 1663. 1 SCHWARTZ, Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1663
Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 93. A core of negative liberties,
including freedom of religion and worship, were protected by the Fundamental Constitutions
of Carolina, 1669 drafted by John Locke, the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
1677, the New York Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges, 1683, and the Pennsylvania Charter
of Privileges, 1701, in 1 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 108, 126, 162, 170.
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extension, the liberties that the American Framers aimed at protecting against the
action of the local governments and, at a later moment against the federal govern-
ment were the negative liberties, those they saw threatened by democracy itself.263
Intimidated by the turbulent circles lived by the republics of the city-states of an-
tiquity, of medieval Europe and of the modern times, they composed the consti-
tutions of their states in order to protect their own system of government from this
self-refutation.264 In parallel, this libertarian conception of rights was considered
perfectly compatible with republicanism and the pursuit of the common good; the
exercise of negative rights was seen as facilitating the common good.265 However,
the common good is understood as protection and promotion of negative liberties.
The American conception of government stresses the need to protect the negative
aspect of self-government, because this is seen as a guarantee among others to pro-
tecting negative liberties.266 According to American republicanism, private liberty
is protected exactly because it promotes this republicanism and makes indispensable
the distinction between the private and the public.267 The innovation of America’s
establishment of a novus ordo seclorum268 consisted of combining a republican po-
litical science with a political philosophy of natural rights: this conception of power
does not legitimize the transfer of a sufficient “quantum of power” in view of leg-
itimizing a strong central power.269 Contrary to Rousseau’s conception of the mor-
alizing reason of the state, Locke opposes his idea of justification (from the point
of view of natural law) of political power as being the transfer to it of the natural
executive power to conserve oneself but for strictly limited aims.270 The political
263 Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 73, 80 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 1977).
264 For the relevant debates around the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 1780, see
ESSEX RESULT (1778), in 1 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 350.
265 See James H. Hutson, The Emergence of the Modern Concept of a Right in America,
The Contribution of Michel Villey, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
AND BEYOND 25, 53 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007).
266 See generally TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35. Tocqueville had also noted that the dominant
civic spirit in America is closely bound to self-interest properly understood, that is to the idea that
negative liberty can be more efficiently protected by participating in the public sphere, especially
locally (Tocqueville develops extensively on administrative decentralization, dominant in the
American political structure), and therefore by making oneself heard in political decision making.
267 See, e.g., Thomas K. Lindsay, Defending Liberalism Book Review of Stephen Holmes,
Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (1995), 82 IOWA L. REV. 943,
950 (1997) (noting that Jefferson thought participation in local government was essential to
maintaining private liberty).
268 See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1985).
269 ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 233; ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS
REPUBLIC, supra note 34 (discussing American innovation of the “natural rights republic”
and the country’s development of political science that supported this political philosophy).
270 LOCKE, supra note 37, at 326–27 (noting that these limited aims are the “peace, safety,
and public good of the people”).
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power thus instituted would have as its only aim to guarantee the qualities which
are “proper” to every human being, his rights and his property, a concept used by
Locke lato sensu, to signify life, liberty, and the individual state proper to each
person.271 The American jus naturalist discourse is permeated by the language of
“natural” rights.272 “Constitutional” rights are interpreted through the prism of
“natural rights.”273 If for the French Declaration, the rights of man have meaning
only as rights of the citizen, the American revolutionary declarations and consti-
tutions aimed at guaranteeing the rights conceived as pre-political, as qualities given
by the creator.274
This jus naturalism was also dominant in the debate between Federalists and
Antifederalists on the opportunity of the promulgation of a Bill of Rights during the
elaboration of the Federal Constitution.275 Thinking that it would be impossible to
make a list of all possible natural rights, the Federalists saw any attempt to make nat-
ural liberty positive as an approach that would be not only “unnecessary,” but also
“dangerous”276 to the extent that it could create the impression that only the enumer-
ated rights are protected to the exclusion of the non enumerated rights.277 Only an enu-
meration of the powers delegated to the federal government would be necessary.278
271 Id. at 324–25. The Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations
of Rights of 1772 (prepared in Boston by a Committee of Correspondence at the suggestion
of Samuel Adams) refers directly to Locke developing a natural rights theory concerning the
origins of civil and political society. 1 SCHWARTZ, The Rights of the Colonists and a List of
Infringements and Violations of Rights, 1772 Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 260, at 199. The text contains an enunciation of rights in affirmative form as well as
in negative form. Id. The text enumerates among the Rights of the Colonists as Subjects,
“personal security[,] personal liberty and private property.” The Rights of the Colonists and
a List of Infringements and Violations of Rights 1772, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 202. It also refers especially to “just and true liberty, equal and im-
partial liberty in matters spiritual and temporal.” Id. at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The text contains explicit limitations of the legislative power upon “lives and fortunes of the
people.” Id. at 203. The same liberties were stressed in the Declaration and Resolves of the
First Continental Congress of 1774. SCHWARTZ, Declaration and Reserves of the First
Continental Congress, 1774 Commentary, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 260, at 219.
272 See, e.g., ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC, supra note 34, at 116.
273 Id.
274 See infra Part II.B.2.
275 Thomas Jefferson insisted on the necessity to elaborate a Bill of Rights. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in POLITICAL WRITINGS , supra note 133,
at 360–61.
276 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); see also CORNELIA GEER LEBOUTILLIER,
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL LAW 110 (1950).
277 James Madison, SPEECH TO THE HOUSE EXPLAINING HIS PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
WITH NOTES FOR THE AMENDMENTS SPEECH, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 51, 60 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
278 Randy E. Barnett, Introduction to James Madison’s Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 277, at 4–5.
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The Ninth Amendment to the Federal Constitution279 is the result of a compromise
reached by the American founders, so that the Federal Constitution would be .280
According to the Federalist reading of Akhil Reed Amar, both the Ninth and the
Tenth Amendments281 were initially aimed at protecting self-government on the level
of the states, preventing Congress from going beyond the powers enumerated in the
Federal Constitution.282 It protected the negative aspect of political liberty, of local
self-government against infringement from the federal state.283 “[B]y the 1860s [this
reading] of the Ninth Amendment had faded considerably.”284 However, even if, ac-
cording to the Federalist reading, the American Bill of Rights initially aimed to ensure
structural equilibriums of the organization of the federal state—such as state’s rights
and majority rights as well as the protection of various intermediate associations—it
also aimed to protect individuals and minorities.285 Even if considerations of federal-
ism weighed heavily in the elaboration of the Amendments, the philosophy of natural
rights inevitably marked the Founders’ understanding of liberty on all levels, federal
and state.
According to the Federalist reading, the First Amendment initially aimed to mod-
erate attenuated representation in the Congress, as Congress was considered less likely
to reflect majority will.286 Following the Fourteenth Amendment and according to the
new interpretation of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment, no
limitation of freedom of expression is acceptable, whether coming from the federal
government or the states. The textual foundation, which aimed to protect the auton-
omy of the states concerning religious questions, became a foundation for federal
limitations against any policy of the states, which would violate the individual rights
of their citizens concerning any act of manifestation of freedom of religious con-
science in terms of equality.287 The history of the Bill of Rights in the United States was
279 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment reads: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.” Id.
280 Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152–53 (1928).
281 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment reads: “The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” Id.
282 AMAR, supra note 134, at 124.
283 Id. at 123.
284 Id. at 124.
285 Amar also notes that the protection of the people against self-interested government,
the distrust against government, weighed as importantly as the protection of minorities against
majorities. Id. at xiii.
286 AMAR, supra note 134, at 22. For a critique of Amar’s argument, see supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
287 Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation, Reconstruction, and Interpretation of the Bill of Rights,
in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND, supra note 265, at 166.
For Amar, Madison’s vision—the protection of individual liberty and minority rights against
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affected by the American Revolution and the Reconstruction following the Civil War.
The natural rights philosophy, which implies the necessity to protect minority rights,
is centered around the power of the judges against the abuses of local governments,
which existed in the founding era and was reaffirmed when Americans realized that
they ought to strengthen the federal government in this direction.288 Certainly, the
strong protection for freedom of religion was the result of the case law of the “full
flowering” of the Warren Court,289 which ruled that a strong protection of freedom
of religion fit better in the general narrative of the ideas of the American founding,
the “natural rights” philosophy.290 This new reading won because ideas that had been
present throughout the history of the Republic manifested themselves in the new
circumstances with greater intensity.
B. The Role of the Law
1. The Legislator—Institutor of Civil Society in France
The opposition between trust in the use of collective power dominant in France
versus the distrust dominant in the United States manifests itself in the organization
of the two constitutional orders as a trust or distrust towards the legislator. The French
Declaration shows trust towards the legislator to define the content and the limits of
liberty. If the relation that each person maintains with herself is mediated by the state
and liberty is defined by the state, then the law is the medium par excellence which
defines this relation guaranteeing the “real” and “effective” exercise of liberty. In the
French political order, the law reflecting the doctrine of integral absolutism, which
Bodin291 developed to the profit of the monarchy, was a political operator to recon-
struct reality. A quasi-unlimited trust towards the legislator is omnipresent, which
means assigning to it the task to liberate human beings by constituting them into cit-
izens and to provide for their happiness. The law is not considered as being in anti-
nomic relation to liberty as it is the case in the United States.
the intolerance of the majority—was very progressive for its time, whereas a local spirit was
largely dominant. AMAR, supra note 134, at 172. The historical irony exists in the fact that
the vision of Madison, a slaveholder, in favor of freedom of expression, was enacted as valid
law by the generation of the Reconstruction, which insisted on the idea that the right inter-
pretation of the Bill of Rights should imply the limitation of the abusive power of the states.
Id. at 174.
288 See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship,
and Civil Rights after the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 47 (1987).
289 McConnell, supra note 36, at 1412.
290 McConnell insists on the fact that “the movement towards more expansive notion of
religious liberty would gain momentum in the wake of the American Revolution and shape
the framing of state and federal constitutions.” Id. at 1435.
291 See JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALTH (1583), reprinted in THE SIX
BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALTH (Richard Knulles, trans. 1606) (translating JEAN BODIN, LES
LIVRES SUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE (1583)) (describing Bodin’s views on absolutism and sovereignty).
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This political culture is associated with the perspective of a legislator creator,
a sovereign institutor, of a total seizure of society by a regulating power.292 The
French Declaration affirms the rights of a politically constituted society, crucial for
the physiocrats, the rights of liberty, property, and security.293 However, the protec-
tion of these rights is associated with the need of an omnipotent state entrusted with
realizing these rights. Paradoxically, the idealism of the French declaration becomes
a positivism concerning the understanding of the protection of liberty.294 It is basi-
cally Sieyès who makes the association between the general will and the will of the
nation.295 The Parliament in France usurped the sovereign power of the nation in the
name of the “General Will” which it claims to represent.296
The French Declaration shows trust towards the legislator to define the content
and the limits of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. This quasi-unlimited
trust seems to be limiting the guarantees of the rights of man, reducing the pre-
eminence of the law to the preeminence of the legislator. Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the
Declaration refer to the positive law and not the natural law.297 The French Framers
292 PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY IN FRANCE SINCE
THE REVOLUTION 55–57 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2007) (translating LE MODÈLE POLITIQUE
FRANÇAIS, LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE CONTRE LE JACOBINISME DE 1789 À NOS JOURS 93 (2004)).
293  STÉPHANE RIALS, LA DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN 352–54
(1988).
294 This positivism is particularly visible in Articles 4 and 5. Article 4 states:
Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others:
thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds
other than those that ensure to the other members of society the en-
joyment of these same rights. These bounds may be determined only
by Law.
Article 5 states: “The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that are injurious to society.
Nothing that is not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be compelled to do what
the Law does not ordain.” Id. These two articles, as Stéphane Rials shows, seem to exclude
the references to natural law, expressing the idea that in order to claim a harm before a judge,
it must be taken into consideration by the law. Id.
295 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Qu’Est-ce que le Tiers État?, in ÉCRITS POLITIQUES, 162
(1985); see also Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Lois, in id. at 87–88; Stéphane Rials, Sieyès ou la
Délibération Sans la Prudence, Eléments pour une Interprétation de la Philosophie de la
Révolution et de l’Esprit du Légicentrisme, in UNE PRUDENCE MODERNE? 45–73 (Philippe
Raynaud & Stéphane Rials eds., 1992).
296 RAYMOND CARRÉ DE MALBERG, LA LOI, EXPRESSION DE LA VOLONTÉ GÉNÉRALE
20–21 (1931).
297 The Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right
to take part, personally or through their representatives, in its making.
It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens,
being equal in its eyes, shall be equally eligible to all high offices,
public positions and employments, according to their ability, and with-
out other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, supra note 55, art. 6.
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could not politically accept the idea of “natural rights” transcending the determi-
nation of positive law.298 Article 10, which guarantees freedom of religion, foresees
its limits: “the [public order established by] the law[s].”299 The meaning of the public
order will be determined by competent state agents and principally by the legislature.
Article 11, which guarantees freedom of expression, similarly foresees its limits in
cases of “abuse,” which is also defined by the legislative.300 The influence of Rousseau
is visible: national sovereignty can produce good laws, not threatening but effectively
protecting liberties.301 Trusting the law to define the content and the limits of liberty
in order to create values and define what is just or unjust is associated with the po-
litical theology surrounding the role of the legislator: omnipotent and omniscient, qual-
ities attributed by theology to divine power, the positive law is an analogue to the
divine law.302 This extraordinary role of the legislator means that liberty is not what
the law leaves undetermined, but only what the law authorizes. Liberty must be de-
fined by the state in opposition to the American legal order where an opposite presump-
tion operates in favor of liberty, where liberty is what the law leaves undetermined.
The omnipotence of the law as expression of the general will, and essentially ex-
pression of the will of the representatives of the people, goes together with a distrust
towards the judges and the control of the constitutionality of the law, institutions which,
in the American legal order, constitute “checks and balances.” This centrality of the
law in the French constitutional equilibrium is visible in the sui generis separation of
powers, characterized by a hierarchy consecrating the supremacy of the legislative
function.303 In the revolutionary torment the debates in favor of establishing a control
of constitutionality faded.304 A control of constitutionality of the law is established
only by the Fifth Republic, which still suffers from Parliamentary “paternalism.”305
The Parliament in France was for a long time the only judge of the constitutionality
of its own laws.306 The control of constitutionality of the law instituted in the Fifth
298 See LUCIEN JAUME, LA LIBERTÉ ET LA LOI: LES ORIGINES PHILOSOPHIQUES DU
LIBÉRALISME 30 (2000).
299 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, supra note 55, art. 10.
300 “The free communication of ideas and of opinions is one of the most precious rights
of man. Any citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount
to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law.” Id. art. 11.
301 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 238.
302 JEAN-MARC TRIGEAUD, 2 HUMANISME DE LA LIBERTÉ ET PHILOSOPHIE DE LA JUSTICE
56–57 (1990).
303 MARC SADOUN, 1 LA DÉMOCRATIE EN FRANCE: IDÉOLOGIES 97 (2000); Jacques
Chevallier, La Separation des Pouvoirs, in LA CONTINUITÉ CONSTITUTIONNELLE EN FRANCE
DE 1789 Á 1989, at 113, 128–29 (Louis Favoureux ed., 1990).
304 See generally MARCEL GAUCHET, LA RÉVOLUTION DES POUVOIRS: LA SOUVERAINETÉ,
LE PEUPLE ET LA REPRÉSENTATION 1789–1799 (1995).
305 Georg Nolte, European and U.S. Constitutionalism: Comparing Essential Elements,
in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 3–20 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005).
306 See generally CARRÉ DE MALBERG, supra note 296, at 113–14.
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Republic and assigned to the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) mod-
erates Rousseau’s conception of infallibility of the law. The recent Constitutional
Law of July 23, 2008 brings significant modifications concerning referral to the
Council.307 However, the history of the Council shows that the control of constitu-
tionality takes place by an organ, which was initially destined at protecting the in-
dependence and the prerogatives of the executive power.308 Establishing an a priori
control until the Constitutional Law of July 23, 2008, the referral to the Council had
the form of an inter-institutional deliberation limited to the institutional actors who
were cooperating in the production of the law—that is, the President of the Republic,
the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the
Senate, and a group of sixty members of the Parliament and sixty senators;309 it was
not the citizens, who could refer to the control of constitutionality of the Council a
propos the application of a law in a specific case. This was an incomplete system,
because laws older than the Fifth Republic had escaped control. Even for new laws
on which the Council had already given its opinion a priori, new cases could appear
in the course of their interpretation where they could be proved a posteriori in their
ad hoc application contrary to the constitution. In the hermeneutic process that takes
place in each attempt to define the applicable legal rule all judges implicitly make
inevitable claims of constitutional validity of the rules that they apply. This was ob-
vious in reference to the European Convention of Human Rights. A de facto diffuse
control of constitutionality was imposed via conventionality because every judge,
even ordinary, controlled the compatibility of a law to the Convention,310 thus pro-
moting the establishment of a rule of law, of an effective control of the compatibility
of the law with the protection of an individual liberty. This control always remained
marked by the ex ante understanding of the role of the state and the law as realizing
the content of liberty, as the case law accepting limitations of freedom of expression
proves.311 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases con-
cerning headscarves does not deviate from this conception either.312
307 Loi 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la V° République
[Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 to Modernize the Institutions of the Fifth Republic],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
July 24, 2008, p. 890.
308 The aim of the Framers was not to establish an institution in order to guarantee rights
and liberties, but to strengthen the Executive to the detriment of the National Assembly. See
FRANÇOIS LUCHAIRE, 1 LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL: ORGANISATION ET ATTRIBUTIONS
21 (1997). On constitutional justice, see Mauro Cappelletti, Montesquieu Abandonné?
Développement et Légitimité de la “Justice Constitutionnelle,” in LE POUVOIR DES JUGES
249–79 (1990). For a comparison of models of constitutional review, see VICKI C. JACKSON
& MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 464–547 (2d ed. 2006).
309 1958 CONST. 61.
310 Olivier Cayla, Le Coup d’État du Droit, LE DÉBAT, May–Aug. 1998, at 111.
311 See supra Part I.A.1.
312 See supra Part I.A.2.
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Following the Constitutional Law of July 23, 2008 the referral to the court was
enlarged. Article 29 consecrates the possibility of a citizen referring to the Conseil
Constitutionnel in a case pending before a court in which he claims violation of a
right protected by the French Constitution.313 However, the Conseil Constitutionnel
only examines the case once the Conseil d’État, the supreme jurisdiction of the ad-
ministrative branch of the French judiciary, or the Cour de Cassation, the supreme
jurisdiction of the civil branch, have referred the case.314 This revolutionary modifi-
cation of the referral went into effect on March 1, 2010.315 However, even in this case,
citizens cannot appeal directly to the Conseil Constitutionnel. The law establishes a
procedure of incidental control of constitutionality in order to resolve a “prejudicial
question” emerging in a case pending before civil or administrative jurisdictions,
like the one practiced by the Italian Constitutional Court, according to which the
judge a quo orders the transmission of the case to the Constitutional Court.316 The
Conseil d’État or the Cour de Cassation can still filter the citizens’ request of con-
trol of constitutionality.317 The Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d’État can refer
the law to the Council if it “has not already been declared in conformity with the
Constitution (by the Conseil Constitutionnel), unless circumstances have changed.”318
The Conseil Constitutionnel has already given its opinion on the burka ban thus ex-
cluding the possibility of future referral.319 It has not, however, given an opinion on
the 2004 law banning the headscarf in public schools, which can now happen upon
referral of the Conseil d’État, if a new case emerges.
313 Loi 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la V° République
[Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 to Modernize the Institutions of the Fifth Republic], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 24,
2008, p. 890.
314 See 1958 CONST. 61-1 (Fr.).
315  Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la
Constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009 on the Application of Article 61-1 of the
Constitution], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, p. 21379.
316 Id.
317 Ordonnance 58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 portant loi organique sur le Conseil
Constitutionnel [Ordinance 58-1067 of November 7, 1958 organic law on the Constitutional
Council], amended by Law 2009-1523 of Dec. 10, 2009.
318 Id. § 23-2. According to Article R 771-6 of the Code of Administrative Justice, as
modified,
[C]ourt[s] [are] not required to pass a constitutional priority involving, for the same
reasons, a law which the Council of the State or the Constitutional Council is al-
ready seized. In the absence of transmission for this reason, postpone a decision on
the merits, until it is informed of the decision of the State Council or, where approp-
riate, the Constitutional Council.
CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C.ADM] art. R 771-6 (Fr.); see also id. art. R 771-18 (for the Conseil
d’État); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.PR.C.] art. 126-5 (for the Cour de Cassation).
319 Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] No. 2010-613, Oct. 7, 2010 (Fr.).
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2. The American Conception of Checks and Balances
If the French Declaration shows what the law should be, the American declara-
tory texts show what the law cannot be. The declarations of the ancient British colo-
nies are situated in a classical contractual perspective, favorable to the American spirit,
which pose firmly the persistence of the natural rights of man in the social state and
exalts less the role of positive law. The American Declarations indicate a concern for
more specific guarantees, especially by the courts than the French, which ignore the dis-
tinction between the declaration of rights and the guarantee of rights. The American
Bill of Rights, which includes the common denominator of liberties protected in the
various states, is marked by the procedural conception of law of the English. The
American Bill of Rights, which preceded the constitutions of the American states
enacted between 1776–1789, had different aims in relation to those of the French
Declaration: pragmatism versus metaphysical proclamation. The Declarations of the
United States are conceived in a way as to be able to be invoked before the courts,
whereas the French Declaration aimed at proclaiming incontestable truths.320 Unlike
the French Declaration, which trusts the law to assure its application, the American
Bill of Rights expose the domains of human activity, which are covered by liberty
and cannot be touched by the law.
The will to limit the legislative power is already visible in the first constitutions
of the states, dating back to the American Revolution, when declarations of rights
were imposed to the legislatures.321 It is enunciated again in the first eight Articles of
320 Emile Boutmy, La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen et M. Jellinek, in
17 ANNALES DES SCIENCES POLITIQUES 415, 424 (Félix Alcan, ed., 1902) (criticizing GEORGE
JELLINEK, LA DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN, CONTRIBUTION À
L’HISTOIRE DU DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL MODERNE (Georges Fardis trans., 1902) for under-
stating the differences of the two texts despite some influence of the one upon the other).
321 The reference to the “natural rights” philosophy, which by its nature concerns the leg-
islative power as well as the executive power, exists in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 (which had Thomas Paine as one of
its makers), the Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, the Vermont Declaration of Rights
of 1777, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, and the New Hampshire Bill of
Rights of 1783. Texts reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 260, at 179–375. Explicit pro-
tection of freedom of religion exists in the Declarations of Rights of Virginia (para. 16),
Pennsylvania (art. II), Delaware (sec.2), Maryland (art. XXXIII), Connecticut (para. 2),
Vermont (art. III), Massachusetts (art. II), New Hampshire (art. V), and the Constitutions of
New Jersey of 1776 (art. XVIII), Georgia of 1777 (art. LVI), New York of 1777 (art. XXXVIII)
and South Carolina of 1778 (art. XXXVIII). Id. Many of these texts explicitly protect free-
dom of the press: the Virginia (para. 12), Maryland (art. XXXVIII), Vermont (art. XIV),
Massachusetts (art. XVI) Declarations and the Georgia (art. LXI) and South Carolina
(art. XLIII) constitutions. Id. Many of the same texts contain guarantees against cruel and
unusual punishments: the Virginia (para. 9), the Maryland (art. XIV) Declarations, and the
South Carolina Constitution refers to proportionality in criminal punishment (art. XL). Id.
A reference to property in association to security and happiness exists in the Pennsylvania
(art. I), Virginia (para. 1), Vermont (art. I), Massachusetts (art. I), Declarations and the New
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the Constitution of Philadelphia, before the assurance of a control of constitutional-
ity of the laws largely practiced on the local level.322 The comparison of the French
Declaration and the American Bill of Rights shows the absence in the latter of the
equivalent of Articles 4,323 5,324 and 6325 of the French text, which show the trust of
the Framers in the reason of the legislator to realize the imperatives of natural law.
If the French deputies did not have the experience of modern constitutionalism, the
American colonies had had the habit of an elaborated political practice and had al-
ready experienced the harmful potentialities of the law.
In 1776, Americans were concerned with the protection of their rights in terms
of representation.326 When the Confederation proved to be institutionally insufficient
Hampshire Bill of Rights (art. II). Id. Protection against ex post facto criminal laws exists
in the Maryland (art. XV), and Massachusetts (art. XXIV) Declarations. Id. The Virginia
Declaration refers to a general conception of limited government and to the separation of
powers (para. 5) and the Pennsylvania Declaration refers to the right “to apply to the leg-
islature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance” (art. XVI). Id.; see
also Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 251, 261 (1992).
Madison elaborated a list of rights containing the “common denominator” of rights protected
by state governments. The idea of a Bill of Rights just as the content of the Federal Bill of
Rights appeared on the level of the states first. See JOHN PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986) (presenting the
debates in states Assemblies); see also John P. Kaminski, Liberty Versus Authority: The
Eternal Conflict in Government, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 213, 222 (1992) (providing similar insights
on the debates).
322 PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra
note 260, at 265–67.
323 See supra note 290 and accompanying text. Considerations of Federalism are at the
origin of the absence of a similar clause in the Federal Bill of Rights. However, even in state
Declarations the relevant clauses are much less limiting liberty and indicating greater distrust to-
wards the legislator than the French Declaration. For example, Article XII of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, 1780, reads:
And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his
property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law,
exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty or estate; but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land. And the legislature shall not make any law,
that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, ex-
cepting for the government of the army and navy, without trial by jury.
MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1780), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 260,
at 342.
324 See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 293 and accompanying text
326 Because the British Parliament limited the liberties of the American colonies, while
they were not represented in it, the dominant idea was that once the problem of representation
was resolved, the Parliaments of the States would not constitute a source of potential danger.
Many Americans like John Adams in 1775 saw in the concept of “democratic despotism” a
contradictio in terminis. Barry A. Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the Declaration of
Independence, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 116,
131 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007) (explaining that the communitarian spirit of the American
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to enforce its commands and the necessity to create a federal state emerged, the de-
bate on the Federal Constitution brought up again the discussion on the control of
the Parliamentary majority on all levels.327 The decade before adoption of the Federal
Constitution judicial review was practiced by states’ courts, which were considered
the authority that would enforce the protection of rights against the legislature.328
The debate between Federalists and Antifederalists indicates the same distrust to-
wards state power. The opposition to the Federal Constitution was founded on the fear
of a central power violating liberties protected by the states.329 The realization of the
necessity to construct a federal government went together, especially for Madison,
with the recognition of the capacity of the governments of the states to protect better
the rights of the citizens against abuses of authorities.330
Madison was thus led to conceive the role of the judiciary power as limiting the
majoritarian will and guaranteeing the liberty of minorities. If in France the generality
of the law was the response to the privileges and the abuses of political power of the
ancient regime, in the United States the principal political problem for Madison was
the tyranny of the generality of the law resulting from social and political majorities
threatening minorities.331 In addition to the Bill of Rights, these guarantees in favor of
liberty would be made effective by a federal legislative veto concerning the laws of the
federal government and the establishment on the federal level of a council of revision,
with limited veto on federal laws and a role of participation in the federal control of the
laws of the states.332 Although the process of the establishment of the federal “judiciary
hegemony” was itself a victory in the fight to promote the federal union and to es-
tablish the supremacy of the Federal Constitution upon the states,333 the tendency to
limit the powers of the legislative branch is obvious on the federal and state level.
cities commonly led to limitations on liberty); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of the American
Bill of Rights, in XIV LA REVUE TOCQUEVILLE 33, 39 (1993) (quoting John Adams, Novanglus,
in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 79 (Charles F. Adams ed., Bos. 1850–56, IV)). The idea that
democratic despotism was possible was spread throughout the 1780s.
327 Carl J. Friedrich & Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to FROM THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION: THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
li (C.J. Friedrich & Robert G. McCloskey eds., 1954).
328 SCHWARTZ, supra note 260, at 435.
329 Id. at 443–44.
330 AMAR, supra note 134, at 4 (describing Madison’s development of these ideas in THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 10 and 46, respectively).
331 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Letter of June 8, 1789: Amendments to
the Constitution, in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson
eds., 1978). If Jefferson, as representative of the United States in France, enunciated the prob-
lem of rights in traditional terms of the protection of the citizens against the government,
Madison was more worried about the dangers inherent in political decision-making on behalf
of popular majorities to the detriment of minorities.
332 James T. Barry III, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 249–53 (1989).
333 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 52 (Sanford Levinson, ed.,
4th ed. 2005) (1960).
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III. DOES THE BURKA BAN PROMOTE OR NEGATE LIBERTY?
The burka ban is a hard case. Guaranteeing the preconditions for the exercise
of liberty and assuring that negative liberty does not degenerate into an empty form
is a legitimate cause. Protecting women from domination, if we suppose that the
headscarf has negative meaning for gender equality, is an equally important goal.334
Has France perhaps gone too far? Is this kind of prohibition the best possible measure
for promoting gender equality? Is the state permitted to use its coercive power in
order to change the worldviews of citizens and residents in its territory, or are there
different measures which might be preferable and which would assure the respect
of dignity and autonomy of women? These are delicate questions concerning the hard
core of self-definition. To what extent is the state permitted to intervene in the relation
that a person has with herself expressed in her dress choices? Is the state permitted
to protect women from themselves, under the pretext that they are operating under a
“false consciousness,” that they do not exercise their freedom properly when they wear
a headscarf? Who is permitted to decide what people will wear in the public sphere?
Who is permitted to interpret the meaning of wearing headscarves? Is the ban the
proper integration policy? Deontological as well as consequentialist justifications
of the prohibition do not withstand closer scrutiny.
According to the dominant conception in France, the state is permitted to regu-
late the school community and to impose special rules concerning the manifestation
of beliefs, which should belong to the private sphere, in order to prevent influence
of one student upon another.335 One can respond that being in a special relation of
domination, participating in a specific public community as the school community
does not necessarily mean that the person cannot enjoy the exercise of her funda-
mental rights. The fact that minors are at issue, rather than adults does not deprive
them of the possibility of exercising a fundamental freedom. This cannot be condi-
tioned upon the status of a minority or adulthood. Just like a person cannot be
tortured, her religious freedom and manifestation of her religious freedom cannot
be limited in school either.
One of the principal justifications advanced by the French state in favor of the ban
consists in attributing a meaning to it, which totally ignores the meaning that it has for
the women-bearers themselves. The burka may be interpreted as having a “cultural” and
political significance and not religious, preexisting the appearance of Islam, imposed
by some intellectuals in the beginning of the twentieth century in Saudi Arabia.336 This
argument is invalid because any symbol can obtain a religious significance after the
appearance of a religious dogma. The sign of the cross preexisted Christianity.337
334 See Weil, supra note 29, at 2706.
335 See, e.g., LAURENCE & VAISSE, supra note 68, at 55 (noting the secular nature of French
schools and the concomitant effects on Muslim students).
336 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 27.
337 JOHN GARNIER, THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD 226 (1904).
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Freedom of religion means the possibility to assign religious significance and carry
signs that preexisted the emergence of the religion that assigned them this meaning.
The state is not permitted to put forward a specific interpretation of the meaning of
the burka in order to justify the ban. The report of the French Parliament attempts to
minimize the religious importance of the burka by insisting on the fact that it is based
on a minority and contestable interpretation of the Coranic texts and the Muslim
traditions.338 This is an unacceptable projection of an interpretation by the state of the
significance of the scarf. It is another sign of the dominant paternalistic conception
in France aiming at defining the content of religious liberty, which belongs to the sub-
ject of the liberty. Islam is a historically decentralized culture: there is not one “single
Muslim ‘culture’ which [would] [ ] correspond to the sociological and demographic
profiles of the immigrant populations now residing in Europe.”339 Attributing to
Muslims one single identity is a kind of unacceptable objectification.340
Another justification advanced by the French state is a conception of human
dignity, because in Christianity the face has become the “quintessence of the person,”
the “noble part of the body.”341 Hiding the face is thus a sign of an “undignified” ex-
istence. It is not acceptable for the state to use the internal perspective of one religious
worldview to criticize the internal perspective of another. Offense to mores is not
a sufficient justification to ban a practice, which is an expression of freedom of self-
definition. This is a conception of human dignity, which transcends the individuals
who are its bearers and imposes obligations as to how they should treat themselves.
The concept of dignity has been associated throughout the history of ideas with many
meanings and the reference to it in order to limit a person’s liberty with regard to her
dress choices is open to critique. We can distinguish between an empirical and a nor-
mative conception of dignity.342 An empirical understanding of dignity associates it
with social status and recognition.343 A normative conception of dignity, like the one
proposed by Immanuel Kant, associates the concept with humanity.344 Human beings
are dignified as having the possibility to be rational autonomous beings.345 For Kant,
dignity is a supreme value without equal that assigns to the person the quality of an
end in itself; as morality is the only condition which can make a reasonable being,
an end in itself—for Kantian thought it is only by morality that someone can be
338 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 36.
339 JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 6 (2007).
340 Id. at 7.
341 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 32.
342 See Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 11–14 (Michael J. Meyer & William
A. Parent eds., 1992) (proposing this distinction).
343 Id. at 11–12.
344 Id. at 12–13.
345 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 73 (Robert Paul
Wolff ed., Lewis W. Beck trans., 1969); see also ZIVIA KLEIN, LA NOTION DE DIGNITÉ
HUMAINE DANS LA PENSÉE DE KANT ET DE PASCAL (1968).
846 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:791
autonomous—only humanity, capable of morality possesses dignity.346 For Kant, man
as a reasonable being constitutes an end in itself by virtue of his autonomy, for it is
only a will that legislates for itself that can be considered an end in itself: however, it
is only in conditions of morality that the reasonable “man” can develop his autonomy,
legislating the rules which satisfy the criterion of universality.347 According to this
moral sense, human dignity is uncompromisable and cannot be enforced by the state.
Human dignity today means that everyone has the right to equal attention and equal
respect on behalf of the government.348 The right from which all rights logically em-
anate is the right to self-definition, of the choice of ends and plans of life.
For the French state, the burka violates the right to dress oneself as one wishes:
the ban thus liberates women.349 This is another example of an interpretation of the
content of a liberty coming from the state. The burka can be a choice liberating
women from the social constraints of fashion, which they see as elements of moral
corruption belonging to a materialistic way of life. And in any case, freedom con-
tains the possibility of some “voluntary servitude.”350
Another argument of the French state is that the principle of laïcité means that
the Republic respects all beliefs, but in parallel the citizens must also respect a duty
of discretion concerning the exteriorization of their religious beliefs.351 According
to the Report, the dominant conception of laïcité in France is associated with social
integration and cohesion, which means that the ban is based on the need to guarantee
liberty and the respect of the opinions of others.352 To the extent that manifestation
of religious belief does not imply harm to others it is difficult to see why this dis-
cretion is required.
Another argument stresses incivility, the refusal of fraternity of the very possi-
bility of social coexistence associated with the will to hide oneself.353 However, one
of the basic axioms of the philosophical discourse of modernity is individual con-
sensus concerning the degree of adherence to society. The use of state punitive mech-
anisms against adopting an “anti-social” behavior cannot be justified if this behavior
does not harm others. The burka is a means of guaranteeing women’s privacy in the
public sphere. The impossibility to tolerate this behavior has its origins in the values
346 See KANT, supra note 345, at 76.
347 KANT, supra note 345, at 76; THOMAS DE KONINCK, DE LA DIGNITÉ HUMAINE (1995);
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Dignité, in DICTIONNAIRE D’ÉTHIQUE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE MORALE
438–40 (Monique Cantö-Sperber ed., 2001).
348 See DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 201.
349 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 95.
350 Étienne Balibar, Dissonances dans la Laïcité, in LE FOULARD ISLAMIQUE EN QUESTIONS
15, 24 (Charlotte Nordmann ed. 2004).
351 See Blandine Chalini-Pont, Is Laïcité the Civil Religion of France?, 41 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 765, 771 (2010) (noting the grand importance in France of maintaining a sec-
ular society).
352 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 94 (citing the hearing of Hubert Sage, mem-
ber of the administration of the Association des Libres Penseurs de France, Sept. 16, 2009).
353 Id. at 118 (citing the hearing of Élisabeth Badinter, Sept. 9, 2009).
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of the Republic: the contradictory goals of the French Revolution which were the
refutation of authorities, that is the refutation of the absorption of the individual
subject in the harmony of the cosmos, according to the ancient conception of natural
law, while conserving in parallel the idea of the ancients of a social nature of man
in order to respond to the social question of mass poverty. The possibility to judge
for oneself, the claim of the enlightenment, was seen as inseparable from the neces-
sity to assure this existence. However, this overestimation of the role of the state in or-
der to guarantee human existence had as consequence to legitimize its role in order to
define the opinions, which are worthy of being heard towards the formation of individ-
ual personality. In other words, if it is citizenship that dignifies human beings, if it is
being a citizen that makes one a man as far as all aspects of existence are concerned,
this leads to accepting a particularly extensive role for the state in order to define all the
components of human existence, opinions and ideas included. According to the French
conception civil society coincides with the political society. If it is belonging to a
community, which thanks to language contributes to moralization and to the devel-
opment of the discursive, reasonable faculties of man, the nexus between the im-
portance of this membership to the community and the overdetermination on behalf
of the community of spheres, which should belong to the judgment of the subject,
becomes obvious. This is equivalent to the limitation of the very possibility of re-
flexivity for the subject. If it is society that conditions and makes possible through
socialization this reflexivity, the individual should preserve the possibility of critical
appreciation of the norms of society. If it is membership in a community that makes
a human being dignified, this dignity, at the same time, imposes the possibility for a
withdrawal from the community and the recognition of the possibility of the subject
to appreciate for herself under a critical and reflective vision this very membership
in the community.
Apart from these reasons of principle, the prohibition does not seem justified on
consequential grounds either as the proper political response to religious fundamen-
talism. A quarter of the 1,900 women actually wearing the burka in France354 have
recently converted to Islam or were born in a non-Muslim religion and culture,
while two-thirds of them already possess the French nationality and half of them
belong to third and second generations of immigrants.355 The Report of the French
Parliament notes that women who wear the burka see it as a sign of membership to
an “elite, to a religious avant-garde called to guide the stray Muslim community.”356
Philosophers describe the phenomenon as the “zeal of the converted,”357 expressing
the distance of the freshly converted from their origins including their family
354 Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, La Burka, la Femme et l’État, Réflexions Inquiètes sur
un Débat Actuel, (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.raison-publique.fr/article317.html.
355 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 42.
356 Id. at 44 (citing the hearing of Samir Amghar, Researcher at L’École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales–Paris, of November 4, 2009).
357 Id. at 45 (citing Abdennour Bidar, hearing of July 8, 2009).
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surrounding,358 which is not approved by the wider Muslim community. In many cases
it is a sign of “religious hyperindividualism”359 of women who would like to take
some distance from a wider society that they judge as corrupt. Contemporary fun-
damentalisms are not univocal or linear: the re-activation of faith serves the role of
self-definition of the individual in relation to the traditions to which she belongs.360
They are substituting personal conviction to the domination of custom and community.
The radicalism on behalf of the Muslims inhabiting contemporary France, in partic-
ular the youth of Parisian suburbs, is due to what they perceive as the perpetuation of
the mentality of colonialism on behalf of the French state.361 Headscarf bans are not the
appropriate political response, because it is impossible to do away with a social phe-
nomenon of radicalism by avoiding seeing it. In this sensitive context, bans are seen
as attacks to one’s identity. They seem to be disproportionate measures to assure the
envisioned aims, introducing violence and running the risk to stir more reaction in
the long term.
The question concerns the larger issue of immigration and the colonial past of
France.362 The influx of Muslim immigrants from the colonies to the metropolis was
initially encouraged by the French state because they were indispensable to the con-
struction of public works of infrastructure in the country.363 If immigrants enter a
country and remain, this means that they are needed in the society that receives them
and that they fulfill an essential economic role. Otherwise, the difficulties in surviving
would have forced them to leave. This economic reality leads to a moral argument in
favor of respecting these immigrants. If their presence and their work contributes to
the everyday well-being of the citizens of the society of reception, as their work
force is indispensable to the economy of the country that receives them, then that
country has the moral obligation to treat them as equal members in everyday delib-
erations about political action. They should be offered the possibility to reflect upon
the practice of wearing the burka. It is persuasion, and not coercion, that respects
them as equal deliberating members in a conception of the population as open, fluid
and reflective.364 The public sphere starts in our everyday communicative practices
358 Id. (citing the historian Benjamin Stora’s use of the terms “challenge towards the
parents” and “challenge towards the school,” hearing of November 18, 2009).
359 Id. at 46 (according to the expression of Samir Amghar).
360 GAUCHET, supra note 241, at 38.
361 RAPPORT D’INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 55 (detailing observations of Benjamin Stora).
Events like the 2005 riots are also certainly associated with this perception of the youth of
the suburbs. See LAURENCE & VAISSE, supra note 68, at 2 (noting the participation of Muslim
youth in the 2005 Parisian riots).
362 Pierre Bourdieu, Un Problème Peut en Cacher un Autre, in LE FOULARD ISLAMIQUE EN
QUESTIONS, supra note 350, at 45.
363 LAURENCE & VAISSE, supra note 68, at 16–17.
364 See SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 35–36 (2006) (explaining that
the demos must engage in reflexive acts of self-constitution submitted to the inevitable global
movement of populations).
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on matters of public concern.365 It is composed of a wide and fluid network of in-
terpersonal communications on matters of public concern, and immigrants are an
important part of these practices. These everyday interactions seem to be the best
medium that societies of reception have to express to women and members of their
family their ideas about wearing the burka. Dialogue, and not prohibition, respects
women’s dignity.
Whether the burka ban is seen as a late expression of feelings of guilt towards
these immigrants or as a fear of the differences threatening the French republican
model, it constitutes a serious violation of liberty. The power of the “reason of state”366
of the colonial era is transformed into paternalistic power with the benevolent aim
of protecting women from themselves and from the members of their communities.
Networks of power are dense and heterogeneous; thus, the claim to speak in the name
of these women runs the risk of misunderstanding the circumstances that define their
behavior and of leading to distortions of their situation.367 That French lawmakers claim
to speak for these women sounds like a benevolent intervention motivated by the
need to make up for colonial domination. Recently the French Parliament attempted
to include in a legal text a clause for the French school programs to “recognize the
‘positive role’ of the French presence overseas.”368 This proposal to consecrate an of-
ficial truth on the colonial past in a law that aimed at compensating inequalities and
injustices among repatriated officers of the French army and harkis—local collab-
orators of the colonial regime—was suppressed following the intervention of the
President of the French Republic after the request of five historians.369 Accepting
women as equal interlocutors participating in the public sphere is the proper way to
365 JÜRGEN HABERNAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 365–66 (Thomas McCarthy ed., William Rehg trans., 1996).
366 PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, FACE À LA RAISON D’ÉTAT, UN HISTORIEN DANS LA GUERRE
D’ALGÉRIE (1989); see also FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Constance
Farrington trans., 1963) (discussing the psychic effects of colonial violence on the colonized).
367 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271–313 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).
Spivak notes how the protection of the woman from the men of her own kind has been op-
erating as a key element of imperialism’s image as the establisher of the good society in the
colonial world. Using Spivak’s insight we could note that the constitution of the female sub-
ject is a différend (in the sense that Jacques Derrida attributes to the word in L’ÉCRITURE ET
LA DIFFERENCE), an undefined element projected to the future. The constitution of the female
subject should be open to the self-definition of the women in their own terms and not to the
interpretation of benevolent saviors of women from themselves.
368 See Farid Laroussi, Le Nouveau Révisionnisme, LE MONDE, May 12, 2005, available at
http://www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article633 (detailing the proposed Law of February 23,
2005); see also Pierre Nora, Liberté pour l’Histoire!, LE MONDE, Oct. 11, 2008 (similarly
discussing the legislation).
369 Laetitia Van Eeckhout, Une Disposition Adoptée avec l’Aval du Gouvernement Français,
LE MONDE, June 11, 2005, available at http://www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article686;
Raphaëlle Branche et al., La Responsabilité des Historiens Face à l’Histoire Coloniale, LE
MONDE, Sept. 20, 2005.
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the respect of their dignity. It is also promising as to the possibilities of change of be-
liefs that violate gender equality. Respecting some elements, which seem unacceptable
from our point of view might be a better measure towards encouraging participation
of Muslims in the public sphere. Certainly the creation of the French Council of the
Muslim Religion370 by the French state was a step that should be applauded.
If a general burka ban is compatible with individual liberty, some regulation of
the covering of the face in schools can be justified if it is proved that it seriously im-
pedes the educational process. However, the hijab, which does not cover the face, is
very unlikely to have a similar effect. The state can be permitted to intervene in order
to protect individuals against other powerful actors of civil society, the members of
the families, who are forcing women to wear headscarves. Power does not operate only
on a top-to-bottom scheme, but is omnipresent in all social relations.371 Penalties upon
the members of the families who force women to cover their faces can be justified.
The difficulties in assuring that wearing the burka is a manifestation of free will, and
not the result of physical or psychological force, led to the general ban in the French
law. In case of doubt as to whether the burka is the result of free exercise of one’s
will or imposed by force the presumption should be in favor of liberty and against
state intervention rather than the other way around.
CONCLUSION
This Article aims to present the conflicting legal responses in France and the
United States on a hard case: headscarf bans and religious symbols, which seem to
be incomprehensible and violating gender equality and human dignity. In France, a
paternalistic vision of the state, together with a conception of a secularism imposed
from top-to-bottom legitimizes state intervention for banning religious symbols.372
In the United States, a conception of secularism founded upon the need to accommo-
date religious differences leads to a more tolerant attitude towards religious symbols
even if they seem incomprehensible to the majority of the population.373
370 See French Council of the Muslim Religion Brochure, http://www.lecfcm.fr/wp-content
/uploads/2009/08/cfcm_brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (stating that the Council
has the object to “defend the dignity and the interests of the Muslim religion in France, to fa-
cilitate and organize the sharing of information and services between religious communities,
to encourage dialogue between religions and to assure the representation of the Muslim re-
ligious communities and the public authorities.”) (this author’s translation).
371 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF PRISON (Alan
Sheridian trans., 1995); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley
trans., 1990).
372 See LAURENCE & VAISSE, supra note 68, at 163–64 (explaining the importance of
French secular society, particularly within the school system).
373 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 123–24 (2002)
(citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)) (noting
that religious accommodation should be granted to different religions).
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For Marcel Gauchet, the concept of secularization fails to express a transmu-
tation of the religious element that has taken place: our world is only recomposed,
on new different metaphysical foundations, on the belief in democracy and human
dignity.374 The world is in some sense disenchanted: we do not have recourse to com-
prehensive theories about the origins and the movement of the world. However, our
societies are enchanted by reason and by a belief that we can reasonably change the
world.375 The crucial question then becomes: Who incarnates the best possible ex-
pression of reason? The state or its citizens? The metaphysical foundation of the
French legal order lies in the idea of a state-imposed secularism. France was the
“cradle” of a specific conception of radical democracy. Guaranteeing the precon-
ditions of the exercise of liberty and seeing the state as having a moralizing role can
lead to dangerous slippery slopes of overprotection of individuals from themselves.
In France, the reason of the state is permitted to liberate individuals from their
immaturity.376 The need to guarantee the “real” and “dignified” exercise of liberty
is in this case associated with the guilt of the colonial era as well as the fear of the
other inspired by the invisible, yet existent, Catholic heritage. Behind the negation
of state religion, which reproduces in its extreme form the negation of all manifes-
tation of religion in the public sphere, also lies a Christian majority. Something from
the old is preserved in the new.
In the United States the widespread religiosity377 makes the American legal
order more respectful to religious differences. The religiosity of Americans is ob-
vious even in the United States’ Pledge of Allegiance,378 and has been recognized
by the Supreme Court.379 Tocqueville also noted that in America, religion furnishes
the moral bond which substitutes for the loosening of the political bond.380 Marx crit-
icizing the separation of church and state as an unsatisfactory measure, if not an im-
pediment, to human emancipation, which presupposes the disappearance of religion
itself, cited the example of the United States as a profoundly religious country due
374 GAUCHET, supra note 25, at 7–9 (underlining that we are democrats in a metaphysical
sense: a hidden conversion has changed the relation between believers and non-believers).
375 See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, L’INDIVIDUALISME ET LES INTELLECTUELS (2002) (stressing that
our contemporary societies operate under the cult of reason and the belief in human dignity).
376 See SCOTT, supra note 339, at 2 (explaining the importance of secularism and equality
in French society).
377 ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES
AND UNITES US 1, 2–4 (2010).
378 See Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (stating that the reference to one
nation “‘under God’ w[as] intended to recognize a Supreme Being, at a time when the gov-
ernment was publicly inveighing against atheistic communism”).
379 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963) (“[W]e are a re-
ligious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). For an analysis, see also John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1984).
380 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 273–74.
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to this separation.381 This religiosity makes the American legal order more open to ac-
cepting manifestations of religion in the public sphere. In parallel, the natural rights
philosophy, which permeates the American legal culture, makes the American legal
order overall more tolerant of religious expression. Although American law is far
from being totally consistent in its protection of individuality and its understanding
of human dignity as protection of individual autonomy, it results for a better pro-
tection of religious expression. The natural rights philosophy, which has its origins
in a negative reflex towards the use of collective power at the moment of the foun-
dation of the American democracy and which went through various reinterpretations
throughout history in relation to the contingency of the moment, seems to be
consolidated after the civil rights era towards protecting minorities.
In a sensitive general context full of prejudice and bilateral misunderstandings,
it would be preferable not to use the mechanism of state constraint against dress
decisions that seem to be so profoundly bound with the expression of religious
convictions. The best medium to change perceptions is public dialogue on the ne-
cessity of specific religious garbs. The use of state constraint only perpetuates and ac-
centuates prejudice on both sides. It is a disproportionate measure, which introduces
violence, whose justification and effectiveness is questionable. A belief in a collabo-
rative elaboration of a reasonable solution towards eliminating prejudice against
differences based on gender or religion is more compatible with a commitment to
human dignity.
381 MARX, supra note 49, at 35.
